允许 Envoy 后端协商 TLS 1.3 以接入 Incus

Co-authored-by: panxiao81 <[email protected]>

.gitea/workflows/ansible.yml

@@ -16,9 +16,6 @@ on:
       - '.ansible-lint'
       - '.gitea/workflows/ansible.yml'
 
-env:
-  ANSIBLE_COLLECTIONS_PATH: /root/.ansible/collections
-
 jobs:
   lint:
     runs-on: [self-hosted, pod]
@@ -30,6 +27,7 @@ jobs:
           python3 -m pip install --user --break-system-packages \
             --index-url https://pypi.org/simple --quiet uv==0.11.7
           echo "$HOME/.local/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
+          echo "ANSIBLE_COLLECTIONS_PATH=$HOME/.ansible/collections" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
 
       - name: Install ansible-lint and collections
         run: |
@@ -50,7 +48,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: ansible-lint
         run: |
           export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"
-          export ANSIBLE_COLLECTIONS_PATH="$PWD/infrastructure/samba-ad/ansible/collections:/root/.ansible/collections"
+          export ANSIBLE_COLLECTIONS_PATH="$PWD/infrastructure/samba-ad/ansible/collections:$HOME/.ansible/collections"
           # 静态检查不应依赖生产 vault 凭据。一次性 checkout 可以去掉加密变量文件；
           # syntax-check 只验证结构，不需要解析变量的运行时值。
           rm -f \

.gitea/workflows/hydra.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+name: hydra-login
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - 'apps/hydra/login-consent/**'
+      - '.gitea/workflows/hydra.yml'
+  workflow_dispatch:
+jobs:
+  verify:
+    runs-on: [self-hosted, pod]
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-go@v5
+        with:
+          go-version-file: apps/hydra/login-consent/go.mod
+          cache-dependency-path: apps/hydra/login-consent/go.sum
+      - name: Test authentication boundaries
+        working-directory: apps/hydra/login-consent
+        run: |
+          go test -race ./...
+          go vet ./...
+          CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath .

apps/backstage/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Backstage
+
+Backstage 作为 homelab 的只读开发者门户运行。应用源码、插件、测试和镜像构建归
+`panxiao81/backstage` 仓库管理；本目录只保存 Kubernetes/Flux 部署声明，并通过
+OCI digest 固定镜像。
+
+## 外部前置
+
+- OpenBao `kv/k8s/backstage` 必须包含以下与容器环境变量同名的字段：
+  `BACKEND_SECRET`、`AUTH_SESSION_SECRET`、`AUTH_OIDC_CLIENT_ID`、
+  `AUTH_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET`、`POSTGRES_PASSWORD`、`GITEA_TOKEN`。
+- PostgreSQL 需要在共享集群中预先创建由 `backstage` 角色拥有的 `backstage`
+  数据库；密码必须与 OpenBao 中的 `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` 一致。
+- Authelia OIDC 客户端回调地址为
+  `https://backstage.ad.ddupan.top/api/auth/oidc/handler/frame`。
+- AD DNS 需要将 `backstage.ad.ddupan.top` 指向 Envoy Gateway
+  `192.168.10.127`。
+
+Flux 等待 ExternalSecret 和 Deployment 就绪；任何前置缺失都会使该
+Kustomization 保持 NotReady，而不会回退到明文 Secret。

apps/backstage/deployment.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: backstage
+  namespace: backstage
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: backstage
+    backstage.io/kubernetes-id: homelab-backstage
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  strategy:
+    type: Recreate
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: backstage
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: backstage
+        backstage.io/kubernetes-id: homelab-backstage
+    spec:
+      serviceAccountName: backstage
+      securityContext:
+        fsGroup: 1000
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      containers:
+        - name: backstage
+          image: zot.ad.ddupan.top/panxiao81/backstage@sha256:e5a12550726f19a680bc7c40e2cc07cc624318f9279ee121814d293a006ef210
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
+          env:
+            - name: BACKSTAGE_BASE_URL
+              value: https://backstage.ad.ddupan.top
+            - name: POSTGRES_HOST
+              value: shared-postgresql-rw.shared-db.svc.cluster.local
+            - name: POSTGRES_PORT
+              value: "5432"
+            - name: POSTGRES_USER
+              value: backstage
+            - name: POSTGRES_DATABASE
+              value: backstage
+            - name: GITEA_HOST
+              value: git.ddupan.top
+          envFrom:
+            - secretRef:
+                name: backstage
+          ports:
+            - containerPort: 7007
+              name: http
+              protocol: TCP
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /.backstage/health/v1/readiness
+              port: http
+            initialDelaySeconds: 10
+            periodSeconds: 10
+            timeoutSeconds: 3
+          livenessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /.backstage/health/v1/liveness
+              port: http
+            initialDelaySeconds: 30
+            periodSeconds: 20
+            timeoutSeconds: 3
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 100m
+              memory: 512Mi
+            limits:
+              cpu: "1"
+              memory: 1Gi
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            capabilities:
+              drop: [ALL]
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            runAsNonRoot: true
+            runAsUser: 1000
+          volumeMounts:
+            - mountPath: /tmp
+              name: tmp
+      volumes:
+        - emptyDir: {}
+          name: tmp

apps/backstage/external-secret.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: backstage
+  namespace: backstage
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 1h
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    creationPolicy: Owner
+    name: backstage
+  dataFrom:
+    - extract:
+        key: k8s/backstage

apps/backstage/httproute.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  name: backstage
+  namespace: backstage
+spec:
+  parentRefs:
+    - name: eg
+      namespace: envoy-gateway-system
+      sectionName: https
+  hostnames:
+    - backstage.ad.ddupan.top
+  rules:
+    - matches:
+        - path:
+            type: PathPrefix
+            value: /
+      backendRefs:
+        - name: backstage
+          port: 7007

apps/backstage/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - namespace.yaml
+  - serviceaccount.yaml
+  - rbac.yaml
+  - external-secret.yaml
+  - deployment.yaml
+  - service.yaml
+  - networkpolicy.yaml
+  - httproute.yaml

apps/backstage/namespace.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: backstage
+  labels:
+    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
+    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version: v1.36

apps/backstage/networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: backstage-ingress
+  namespace: backstage
+spec:
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: backstage
+  policyTypes: [Ingress]
+  ingress:
+    - from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: envoy-gateway-system
+      ports:
+        - port: 7007
+          protocol: TCP
+    - from:
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: 192.168.10.127/32
+      ports:
+        - port: 7007
+          protocol: TCP

apps/backstage/rbac.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRole
+metadata:
+  name: backstage-read-only
+rules:
+  - apiGroups: [""]
+    resources:
+      - configmaps
+      - limitranges
+      - pods
+      - pods/log
+      - resourcequotas
+      - services
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [apps]
+    resources:
+      - daemonsets
+      - deployments
+      - replicasets
+      - statefulsets
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [autoscaling]
+    resources:
+      - horizontalpodautoscalers
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [batch]
+    resources:
+      - cronjobs
+      - jobs
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [networking.k8s.io]
+    resources:
+      - ingresses
+    verbs: [get, list, watch]
+  - apiGroups: [metrics.k8s.io]
+    resources:
+      - pods
+    verbs: [get, list]
+---
+apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
+kind: ClusterRoleBinding
+metadata:
+  name: backstage-read-only
+roleRef:
+  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
+  kind: ClusterRole
+  name: backstage-read-only
+subjects:
+  - kind: ServiceAccount
+    name: backstage
+    namespace: backstage

apps/backstage/service.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: backstage
+  namespace: backstage
+  labels:
+    backstage.io/kubernetes-id: homelab-backstage
+spec:
+  selector:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: backstage
+  ports:
+    - name: http
+      port: 7007
+      protocol: TCP
+      targetPort: http

apps/backstage/serviceaccount.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ServiceAccount
+metadata:
+  name: backstage
+  namespace: backstage
+automountServiceAccountToken: true

apps/blocky/compose.yaml

@@ -58,4 +58,4 @@ networks:
   default:
     ipam:
       config:
-      - subnet: 172.28.0.0/24
+        - subnet: 172.28.0.0/24

apps/gitea/README.md

@@ -44,3 +44,15 @@ API、OIDC、Git/Flux 和 runner 均已验证。第二跳按明确决定跳过
 结构，或者 release notes 指出相关 breaking migration 时，才恢复停机一致备份、分阶段
 suspend、详细日志审计和扩展验收。出现启动失败或 migration error 时也立即升级为完整
 故障流程。
+
+## Hydra 人类登录 PoC
+
+新增 `hydra` OIDC 登录源，旧 `authelia` 入口保留。Hydra 通过通用 OIDC Login/Consent
+适配器转到现有 Authelia 完成人类认证；不是 Gitea 直接验证 LDAP 或 SPIFFE。
+入口为 `https://git.ddupan.top/user/oauth2/hydra`，需 LAN/Tailscale 可达 Hydra 内网域名。
+
+新 client secret 通过 `ExternalSecret/gitea-hydra-oidc` 从 OpenBao 投射。沿用
+preferred_username、已验证邮箱与 groups；当前仍映射 gitea-admins，不在本轮切换组模型。
+先部署并验证 Hydra discovery 后再接入本配置，避免 Gitea init 因上游不可达而失败。
+
+实际登录验收与部署状态见 wiki；依赖和回退见 [Hydra README](../hydra/README.md)。

apps/gitea/gitea-values.yaml

@@ -116,6 +116,13 @@ gitea:
       scopes: openid profile email groups
       groupClaimName: groups
       adminGroup: gitea-admins
+    - name: hydra
+      provider: openidConnect
+      existingSecret: gitea-hydra-oidc
+      autoDiscoverUrl: https://hydra.ad.ddupan.top/.well-known/openid-configuration
+      scopes: openid profile email groups
+      groupClaimName: groups
+      adminGroup: gitea-admins
 
 persistence:
   size: 20Gi

apps/gitea/hydra-external-secret.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: gitea-hydra-oidc
+  namespace: gitea
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 1h
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: gitea-hydra-oidc
+    creationPolicy: Owner
+    template:
+      data:
+        key: gitea
+        secret: "{{ .client_secret }}"
+  data:
+    - secretKey: client_secret
+      remoteRef:
+        key: k8s/hydra
+        property: gitea_client_secret

apps/gitea/kustomization.yaml

@@ -16,3 +16,4 @@ resources:
   - helmrepository.yaml
   - helmrelease.yaml
   - httproute.yaml
+  - hydra-external-secret.yaml

apps/hydra/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+# Hydra 与 OIDC Login/Consent PoC
+
+本目录提供独立 Hydra 签发服务，以及一个薄的 **OIDC 上游适配器**。当前上游配置为
+Authelia；适配器不连接 LDAP，也不管理用户目录。Samba AD、密码和 MFA 继续由现有
+Authelia 链路负责。第一轮只接入人类和 Gitea，不实现 agent 动态授权。
+
+```text
+Gitea → Hydra → OIDC Login/Consent → Authelia → Samba AD
+      ← OIDC ← 经验证的上游身份 ← OIDC callback
+```
+
+目标入口：
+
+- `https://hydra.ad.ddupan.top`：Hydra 公共 OAuth2/OIDC endpoint。
+- `https://hydra-login.ad.ddupan.top`：上游 OIDC 登录及 consent 适配器。
+- `hydra-admin.hydra.svc.cluster.local:4445`：仅集群内管理接口，无 HTTPRoute。
+
+均为 LAN/Tailscale 入口，复用 Envoy `eg/https` wildcard TLS。没有增加公网 tunnel。
+部署及实际验收状态以 wiki 和对应 PR 为准，文件存在不表示登录已验收。
+
+## 首次使用与边界
+
+在 Gitea 登录页选择 `hydra`，跳转到 Authelia 完成现有人类认证，再返回原有 Gitea
+账号。旧 `authelia` 登录源保留。Gitea 的账号关联和资源权限仍由 Gitea 维护。
+
+适配器要求验证上游 issuer、audience、签名、过期时间和 nonce，使用 PKCE S256，
+并把单次 state 绑定到 Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite=Lax cookie。短期登录事务只存内存，
+最多 1024 个、10 分钟过期；单副本重启后正在登录的用户需重试，不存人类密码或 token。
+
+Hydra subject 为上游 `(issuer, sub)` 的 SHA-256 加 `human:` 前缀，与可变邮箱/用户名
+分离。第一轮要求上游返回经过验证的 email 及 preferred_username；这些 claims 必须
+明确配置进 ID token。更换 issuer 会改变本 PoC 的 subject，正式迁移前需要身份绑定设计。
+
+仅为显式 `ALLOWED_CLIENTS=gitea` 自动 consent，scope 限于 openid/profile/email/groups；
+拒绝额外 access-token audience，不发 refresh token。只按实际请求 scope 释放 claims。
+这不是通用的无人确认授权服务。组当前透传，沿用 Gitea 的 gitea-admins 映射；统一组
+模型和 agent 认证均在后续阶段。不存在对 Authelia 专有协议的调用。
+
+NetworkPolicy 限制公共端口只接收 Envoy 流量，Hydra admin 只允许适配器访问。
+Hydra 使用正式模式，TLS 由 Envoy 终止；不使用 `--dev`。管理操作使用受控
+`kubectl port-forward`，不要将 admin 接口暴露到 Gateway。
+
+## 依赖、秘密与初始化
+
+依赖共享 CloudNativePG、OpenBao/ESO、Authelia OIDC、Envoy、Samba DNS、zot 镜像仓库。
+Hydra 使用独立 `hydra` database/role，不与其他应用共享数据库角色。
+
+`kv/k8s/hydra` 保存 dsn、system_secret、upstream_client_secret、upstream_client_digest、
+gitea_client_secret；通过 ExternalSecret 投射，值不写入 Git。Bootstrap 创建角色及数据库
+后才启动 Hydra migration。system_secret 必须持久保存，不得在重启时随机重建。
+
+Authelia 中新增 confidential client `hydra-login`：
+
+- redirect URI：`https://hydra-login.ad.ddupan.top/callback`；
+- authorization policy：two_factor；grant：authorization_code；PKCE：S256；
+- token endpoint auth：client_secret_basic；scope：openid/profile/email/groups；
+- claims policy：把 preferred_username、name、email、email_verified、groups 放入 ID token；
+- client secret 的 PBKDF2 digest 存入 Authelia，原值仅供适配器使用。
+
+Authelia 尚非 Flux 管理。修改 Helm values 时保留所有已有 clients 与 secret 引用，
+通过 `--reuse-values` 和最小 overlay 增加客户端，不能以本目录配置覆盖其完整 values。
+
+Hydra 中注册 confidential client `gitea`，redirect URI 为
+`https://git.ddupan.top/user/oauth2/hydra/callback`，grant/response 为 authorization_code/code，
+scope 为 openid/profile/email/groups，token endpoint auth 为 client_secret_basic。
+Gitea 启动时读取 OIDC discovery，所以应先确认 Hydra 健康和 discovery 可达，再接入 Gitea。
+
+## 构建与检查
+
+```bash
+cd apps/hydra/login-consent
+go test -race ./...
+go vet ./...
+CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath -ldflags='-s -w' -o login-consent .
+docker build -t hydra-login-consent:VERSION .
+```
+
+Go module 独立，依赖由 go.sum 锁定；Dockerfile 固定基础镜像 digest。
+使用已授权的短期 SPIFFE zot 凭据发布镜像，部署使用匿名拉取入口与不可变 digest。
+不把 registry 凭据写入源码或 build args。
+
+```bash
+kubectl kustomize apps/hydra
+sudo k3s kubectl -n hydra get deployment,pod,externalsecret,httproute
+sudo k3s kubectl -n hydra logs deployment/hydra -c migrate
+sudo k3s kubectl -n hydra logs deployment/hydra-login
+```
+
+日志不输出上游 token、授权 code、challenge 或秘密。登录失败先查两端 Pod 状态、
+DNS/discovery 连通性、client redirect URI 和 scope，再由用户重新发起登录。
+不要在故障排查中关闭签名验证、MFA 或 state/nonce 校验。
+
+## 恢复与回退
+
+保留共享 PostgreSQL 中 Hydra 数据及 OpenBao 秘密；数据库持有 clients、会话及签名密钥，
+单独重建 Deployment 不能替代恢复数据库。先恢复依赖，再启动 Hydra 和适配器。
+当前恢复仍依赖 homelab 共享基础设施，不能声称已完成独立灾备。
+
+第一轮不切换 Authelia 的主入口。撤回 Gitea 的新增 Hydra 登录源即可回到旧入口；
+先撤消费者，再考虑停用 Hydra。不要删除旧 Authelia 登录源、用户或数据库作为回退手段。
+
+跨服务设计见 [独立 IAM 草案](https://git.ddupan.top/panxiao81/homelab-wiki/src/branch/main/architecture/independent-iam-draft.md)。

apps/hydra/deployment.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: hydra
+  namespace: hydra
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: hydra
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app: hydra
+    spec:
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
+      securityContext:
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        runAsUser: 1000
+        runAsGroup: 1000
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      initContainers:
+      - name: migrate
+        image: docker.io/oryd/hydra:v26.2.0@sha256:ff67c7fb5f95074fa53374d41151713554960504b340cd3f95b09e65deaea2a9
+        args:
+        - migrate
+        - sql
+        - -e
+        - --yes
+        env:
+        - name: DSN
+          valueFrom:
+            secretKeyRef:
+              name: hydra
+              key: dsn
+        securityContext: &id002
+          allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+          readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+          capabilities:
+            drop:
+            - ALL
+        resources: &id001
+          requests:
+            cpu: 50m
+            memory: 64Mi
+          limits:
+            memory: 256Mi
+      containers:
+      - name: hydra
+        image: docker.io/oryd/hydra:v26.2.0@sha256:ff67c7fb5f95074fa53374d41151713554960504b340cd3f95b09e65deaea2a9
+        args:
+        - serve
+        - all
+        - --config
+        - /etc/hydra/hydra.yaml
+        - --sqa-opt-out
+        env:
+        - name: DSN
+          valueFrom:
+            secretKeyRef:
+              name: hydra
+              key: dsn
+        - name: SECRETS_SYSTEM
+          valueFrom:
+            secretKeyRef:
+              name: hydra
+              key: system_secret
+        ports:
+        - name: public
+          containerPort: 4444
+        - name: admin
+          containerPort: 4445
+        resources: *id001
+        securityContext: *id002
+        volumeMounts:
+        - name: config
+          mountPath: /etc/hydra
+          readOnly: true
+        readinessProbe:
+          httpGet:
+            path: /health/ready
+            port: admin
+          initialDelaySeconds: 5
+          periodSeconds: 5
+        livenessProbe:
+          httpGet:
+            path: /health/alive
+            port: admin
+          initialDelaySeconds: 20
+          periodSeconds: 20
+      volumes:
+      - name: config
+        configMap:
+          name: hydra-config

apps/hydra/external-secret.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: hydra
+  namespace: hydra
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 1h
+  secretStoreRef:
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+    name: openbao
+  target:
+    name: hydra
+    creationPolicy: Owner
+  dataFrom:
+  - extract:
+      key: k8s/hydra

apps/hydra/httproutes.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  name: hydra-public
+  namespace: hydra
+spec:
+  parentRefs:
+  - name: eg
+    namespace: envoy-gateway-system
+    sectionName: https
+  hostnames:
+  - hydra.ad.ddupan.top
+  rules:
+  - backendRefs:
+    - name: hydra-public
+      port: 4444
+---
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  name: hydra-login
+  namespace: hydra
+spec:
+  parentRefs:
+  - name: eg
+    namespace: envoy-gateway-system
+    sectionName: https
+  hostnames:
+  - hydra-login.ad.ddupan.top
+  rules:
+  - backendRefs:
+    - name: hydra-login
+      port: 8080

apps/hydra/hydra.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+serve:
+  public:
+    port: 4444
+  admin:
+    port: 4445
+  tls:
+    allow_termination_from:
+    - 10.42.0.0/16
+  cookies:
+    same_site_mode: Lax
+urls:
+  self:
+    issuer: https://hydra.ad.ddupan.top
+    public: https://hydra.ad.ddupan.top
+  login: https://hydra-login.ad.ddupan.top/login
+  consent: https://hydra-login.ad.ddupan.top/consent
+ttl:
+  access_token: 15m
+  id_token: 15m
+  auth_code: 5m
+log:
+  level: info
+  leak_sensitive_values: false
+oauth2:
+  expose_internal_errors: false

apps/hydra/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+- namespace.yaml
+- external-secret.yaml
+- deployment.yaml
+- login-deployment.yaml
+- services.yaml
+- httproutes.yaml
+- networkpolicy.yaml
+configMapGenerator:
+- name: hydra-config
+  namespace: hydra
+  files:
+  - hydra.yaml

apps/hydra/login-consent/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+/login-consent

apps/hydra/login-consent/Dockerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot@sha256:afa5c872c891853ca7fcf1f12c3edb23f7eeef36189728842dd51042ff57f7ab
+COPY login-consent /login-consent
+USER 65532:65532
+ENTRYPOINT ["/login-consent"]

apps/hydra/login-consent/go.mod

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+module git.ddupan.top/panxiao81/homelab-infra/apps/hydra/login-consent
+
+go 1.26.0
+
+require (
+	github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.14.1
+	golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.37.0
+)
+
+require (
+	github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.0.5 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/crypto v0.36.0 // indirect
+)

apps/hydra/login-consent/go.sum

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.14.1 h1:9ePWwfdwC4QKRlCXsJGou56adA/owXczOzwKdOumLqk=
+github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.14.1/go.mod h1:HaZ3szPaZ0e4r6ebqvsLWlk2Tn+aejfmrfah6hnSYEU=
+github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 h1:vj9j/u1bqnvCEfJOwUhtlOARqs3+rkHYY13jYWTU97c=
+github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
+github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.0.5 h1:M6T8+mKZl/+fNNuFHvGIzDz7BTLQPIounk/b9dw3AaE=
+github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.0.5/go.mod h1:s3P1lRrkT8igV8D9OjyL4WRyHvjB6a4JSllnOrmmBOA=
+github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0 h1:ofyhxvXcZhMsU5ulbFiLKl/XBFqE1GSq7atu8tAmTRI=
+github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0/go.mod h1:17dUlkBOakJ0+DkrSSNjCkIjxS6bF9zb3elmeNGIjoY=
+github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 h1:4DBwDE0NGyQoBHbLQYPwSUPoCMWR5BEzIk/f1lZbAQM=
+github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0/go.mod h1:iKH77koFhYxTK1pcRnkKkqfTogsbg7gZNVY4sRDYZ/4=
+github.com/stretchr/testify v1.10.0 h1:Xv5erBjTwe/5IxqUQTdXv5kgmIvbHo3QQyRwhJsOfJA=
+github.com/stretchr/testify v1.10.0/go.mod h1:r2ic/lqez/lEtzL7wO/rwa5dbSLXVDPFyf8C91i36aY=
+golang.org/x/crypto v0.36.0 h1:AnAEvhDddvBdpY+uR+MyHmuZzzNqXSe/GvuDeob5L34=
+golang.org/x/crypto v0.36.0/go.mod h1:Y4J0ReaxCR1IMaabaSMugxJES1EpwhBHhv2bDHklZvc=
+golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.37.0 h1:JUlcxA8oAtauLfiH8FX2/FkAWHAdi0QtGCGc+hofE98=
+golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.37.0/go.mod h1:IxwZNxUULJmpBFf9K/9NTMSIfZZuvuTy1gGxhigP/58=
+gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA=
+gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=

apps/hydra/login-consent/main.go

@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+// Login/Consent adapter for a single trusted upstream and first-party clients.
+package main
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"log"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
+	"golang.org/x/oauth2"
+)
+
+const cookieName = "__Host-hydra-login"
+
+type pending struct {
+	Challenge, Nonce, Verifier string
+	Expires                    time.Time
+}
+type claims struct {
+	Username      string   `json:"preferred_username"`
+	Email         string   `json:"email"`
+	EmailVerified bool     `json:"email_verified"`
+	Name          string   `json:"name"`
+	Groups        []string `json:"groups"`
+}
+type flowRequest struct {
+	Client struct {
+		ID string `json:"client_id"`
+	} `json:"client"`
+	Subject  string   `json:"subject"`
+	Scopes   []string `json:"requested_scope"`
+	Audience []string `json:"requested_access_token_audience"`
+	Context  claims   `json:"context"`
+}
+type app struct {
+	admin, public string
+	client        *http.Client
+	oauth         oauth2.Config
+	verifier      *oidc.IDTokenVerifier
+	allowed       map[string]bool
+	mu            sync.Mutex
+	pending       map[string]pending
+}
+
+func required(key string) string {
+	v := os.Getenv(key)
+	if v == "" {
+		log.Fatalf("missing %s", key)
+	}
+	return v
+}
+func random() string {
+	b := make([]byte, 32)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b)
+}
+func (a *app) api(ctx context.Context, method, path string, in, out any) error {
+	var body io.Reader
+	if in != nil {
+		b, err := json.Marshal(in)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		body = bytes.NewReader(b)
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, a.admin+path, body)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	resp, err := a.client.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return errors.New("Hydra unavailable")
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("Hydra status %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	if out != nil {
+		return json.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20)).Decode(out)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+func (a *app) request(r *http.Request, kind, challenge string) (flowRequest, error) {
+	var f flowRequest
+	if challenge == "" || len(challenge) > 8192 {
+		return f, errors.New("missing or invalid challenge")
+	}
+	err := a.api(r.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/admin/oauth2/auth/requests/"+kind+"?"+kind+"_challenge="+url.QueryEscape(challenge), nil, &f)
+	if err != nil {
+		return f, err
+	}
+	if !a.allowed[f.Client.ID] {
+		return f, errors.New("client not allowed")
+	}
+	return f, nil
+}
+func (a *app) accept(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, kind, challenge string, body any) {
+	var result struct {
+		Redirect string `json:"redirect_to"`
+	}
+	if err := a.api(r.Context(), http.MethodPut, "/admin/oauth2/auth/requests/"+kind+"/accept?"+kind+"_challenge="+url.QueryEscape(challenge), body, &result); err != nil {
+		fail(w, 502)
+		return
+	}
+	// Only Hydra's own authorization endpoint can receive a challenge verifier.
+	u, err := url.Parse(result.Redirect)
+	p, _ := url.Parse(a.public)
+	if err != nil || u.Scheme != p.Scheme || u.Host != p.Host || u.User != nil || u.Path != "/oauth2/auth" {
+		fail(w, 502)
+		return
+	}
+	http.Redirect(w, r, result.Redirect, http.StatusSeeOther)
+}
+func fail(w http.ResponseWriter, status int) { http.Error(w, http.StatusText(status), status) }
+func (a *app) login(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	challenge := r.URL.Query().Get("login_challenge")
+	if _, err := a.request(r, "login", challenge); err != nil {
+		fail(w, 403)
+		return
+	}
+	state := random()
+	p := pending{challenge, random(), oauth2.GenerateVerifier(), time.Now().Add(10 * time.Minute)}
+	a.mu.Lock()
+	for k, v := range a.pending {
+		if time.Now().After(v.Expires) {
+			delete(a.pending, k)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(a.pending) >= 1024 {
+		a.mu.Unlock()
+		fail(w, 503)
+		return
+	}
+	a.pending[state] = p
+	a.mu.Unlock()
+	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{Name: cookieName, Value: state, Path: "/", Secure: true, HttpOnly: true, SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode, MaxAge: 600})
+	http.Redirect(w, r, a.oauth.AuthCodeURL(state, oidc.Nonce(p.Nonce), oauth2.S256ChallengeOption(p.Verifier)), http.StatusSeeOther)
+}
+func (a *app) take(r *http.Request) (pending, error) {
+	state := r.URL.Query().Get("state")
+	cookie, err := r.Cookie(cookieName)
+	if err != nil || state == "" || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(cookie.Value), []byte(state)) != 1 {
+		return pending{}, errors.New("state mismatch")
+	}
+	a.mu.Lock()
+	defer a.mu.Unlock()
+	p, ok := a.pending[state]
+	delete(a.pending, state)
+	if !ok || time.Now().After(p.Expires) {
+		return pending{}, errors.New("expired or used state")
+	}
+	return p, nil
+}
+func (a *app) callback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	p, err := a.take(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		fail(w, 403)
+		return
+	}
+	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{Name: cookieName, Path: "/", Secure: true, HttpOnly: true, SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode, MaxAge: -1})
+	if r.URL.Query().Get("error") != "" || r.URL.Query().Get("code") == "" {
+		fail(w, 403)
+		return
+	}
+	ctx := oidc.ClientContext(r.Context(), a.client)
+	token, err := a.oauth.Exchange(ctx, r.URL.Query().Get("code"), oauth2.VerifierOption(p.Verifier))
+	if err != nil {
+		fail(w, 502)
+		return
+	}
+	raw, ok := token.Extra("id_token").(string)
+	if !ok {
+		fail(w, 502)
+		return
+	}
+	id, err := a.verifier.Verify(ctx, raw)
+	if err != nil || id.Nonce != p.Nonce || id.Subject == "" {
+		fail(w, 403)
+		return
+	}
+	var c claims
+	if id.Claims(&c) != nil || c.Username == "" || c.Email == "" || !c.EmailVerified {
+		fail(w, 403)
+		return
+	}
+	if _, err := a.request(r, "login", p.Challenge); err != nil {
+		fail(w, 403)
+		return
+	}
+	// Stable identity is tied to the verified upstream issuer+subject, never email.
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(id.Issuer + "\x00" + id.Subject))
+	a.accept(w, r, "login", p.Challenge, map[string]any{"subject": "human:" + hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]), "remember": false, "context": c})
+}
+func consentSession(f flowRequest) (map[string]any, error) {
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(f.Subject, "human:") || f.Context.Username == "" || f.Context.Email == "" || !f.Context.EmailVerified {
+		return nil, errors.New("invalid identity context")
+	}
+	allowed := map[string]bool{"openid": true, "profile": true, "email": true, "groups": true}
+	session := map[string]any{"principal_type": "human"}
+	for _, scope := range f.Scopes {
+		if !allowed[scope] {
+			return nil, errors.New("scope not allowed")
+		}
+		switch scope {
+		case "profile":
+			session["preferred_username"] = f.Context.Username
+			session["name"] = f.Context.Name
+		case "email":
+			session["email"] = f.Context.Email
+			session["email_verified"] = true
+		case "groups":
+			session["groups"] = f.Context.Groups
+		}
+	}
+	if len(f.Audience) > 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("access token audience not allowed")
+	}
+	return session, nil
+}
+func (a *app) consent(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	challenge := r.URL.Query().Get("consent_challenge")
+	f, err := a.request(r, "consent", challenge)
+	if err != nil {
+		fail(w, 403)
+		return
+	}
+	session, err := consentSession(f)
+	if err != nil {
+		fail(w, 403)
+		return
+	}
+	// Explicit policy for pre-approved first-party clients only; no generic auto-consent.
+	a.accept(w, r, "consent", challenge, map[string]any{"grant_scope": f.Scopes, "remember": false, "session": map[string]any{"id_token": session}})
+}
+func (a *app) handler() http.Handler {
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	mux.HandleFunc("GET /healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.WriteHeader(200) })
+	mux.HandleFunc("GET /login", a.login)
+	mux.HandleFunc("GET /callback", a.callback)
+	mux.HandleFunc("GET /consent", a.consent)
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+		w.Header().Set("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
+		w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'")
+		mux.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+	})
+}
+func main() {
+	client := &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second, CheckRedirect: func(r *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error { return http.ErrUseLastResponse }}
+	issuer := required("UPSTREAM_ISSUER")
+	ctx := oidc.ClientContext(context.Background(), client)
+	provider, err := oidc.NewProvider(ctx, issuer)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Fatal("upstream discovery failed")
+	}
+	clientID := required("UPSTREAM_CLIENT_ID")
+	a := &app{admin: required("HYDRA_ADMIN_URL"), public: required("HYDRA_PUBLIC_URL"), client: client, allowed: map[string]bool{}, pending: map[string]pending{},
+		oauth:    oauth2.Config{ClientID: clientID, ClientSecret: required("UPSTREAM_CLIENT_SECRET"), RedirectURL: required("CALLBACK_URL"), Endpoint: provider.Endpoint(), Scopes: []string{"openid", "profile", "email", "groups"}},
+		verifier: provider.Verifier(&oidc.Config{ClientID: clientID})}
+	for _, id := range strings.Split(required("ALLOWED_CLIENTS"), ",") {
+		a.allowed[id] = true
+	}
+	s := http.Server{Addr: ":8080", Handler: a.handler(), ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second, ReadTimeout: 20 * time.Second, WriteTimeout: 45 * time.Second, IdleTimeout: 60 * time.Second, MaxHeaderBytes: 16384}
+	log.Print("login/consent adapter listening on :8080")
+	log.Fatal(s.ListenAndServe())
+}

apps/hydra/login-consent/main_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/oauth2"
+)
+
+func TestStateBoundToCookieSingleUseAndExpiry(t *testing.T) {
+	a := &app{pending: map[string]pending{"valid": {Challenge: "challenge", Expires: time.Now().Add(time.Minute)}, "expired": {Expires: time.Now().Add(-time.Minute)}}}
+	request := func(state, cookie string) *http.Request {
+		r := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://login.example/callback?state="+state, nil)
+		if cookie != "" {
+			r.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: cookieName, Value: cookie})
+		}
+		return r
+	}
+	for _, r := range []*http.Request{request("valid", ""), request("valid", "other"), request("expired", "expired")} {
+		if _, err := a.take(r); err == nil {
+			t.Fatal("invalid state accepted")
+		}
+	}
+	if p, err := a.take(request("valid", "valid")); err != nil || p.Challenge != "challenge" {
+		t.Fatal("valid state rejected")
+	}
+	if _, err := a.take(request("valid", "valid")); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("replayed state accepted")
+	}
+}
+func TestConsentRejectsPrivilegeExpansionAndFiltersClaims(t *testing.T) {
+	f := flowRequest{Subject: "human:known", Scopes: []string{"openid", "email"}, Context: claims{Username: "alice", Email: "[email protected]", EmailVerified: true, Groups: []string{"operators"}}}
+	s, err := consentSession(f)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, ok := s["groups"]; ok {
+		t.Fatal("groups leaked without scope")
+	}
+	if _, ok := s["preferred_username"]; ok {
+		t.Fatal("profile leaked without scope")
+	}
+	for _, scope := range []string{"admin", "offline_access", "unknown"} {
+		bad := f
+		bad.Scopes = append([]string{"openid"}, scope)
+		if _, err := consentSession(bad); err == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("accepted %s", scope)
+		}
+	}
+	f.Audience = []string{"other-service"}
+	if _, err := consentSession(f); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("unexpected audience accepted")
+	}
+	f.Audience = nil
+	f.Context.EmailVerified = false
+	if _, err := consentSession(f); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("unverified email accepted")
+	}
+}
+func TestLoginValidatesClientAndUsesPKCEAndNonce(t *testing.T) {
+	admin := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"client": map[string]string{"client_id": r.URL.Query().Get("login_challenge")}})
+	}))
+	defer admin.Close()
+	a := &app{admin: admin.URL, client: admin.Client(), allowed: map[string]bool{"gitea": true}, pending: map[string]pending{}, oauth: oauth2.Config{ClientID: "hydra-login", RedirectURL: "https://login.example/callback", Endpoint: oauth2.Endpoint{AuthURL: "https://upstream.example/authorize"}}}
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	a.handler().ServeHTTP(w, httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://login.example/login?login_challenge=rogue", nil))
+	if w.Code != 403 {
+		t.Fatal("unknown client accepted")
+	}
+	w = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	a.handler().ServeHTTP(w, httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://login.example/login?login_challenge=gitea", nil))
+	if w.Code != 303 {
+		t.Fatalf("status %d", w.Code)
+	}
+	u, _ := url.Parse(w.Header().Get("Location"))
+	q := u.Query()
+	if q.Get("code_challenge_method") != "S256" || q.Get("code_challenge") == "" || q.Get("nonce") == "" || q.Get("state") == "" {
+		t.Fatal("missing protocol binding")
+	}
+	cookies := w.Result().Cookies()
+	if len(cookies) != 1 || !cookies[0].Secure || !cookies[0].HttpOnly || cookies[0].SameSite != http.SameSiteLaxMode || cookies[0].Value != q.Get("state") {
+		t.Fatal("unsafe cookie")
+	}
+	if w.Header().Get("Cache-Control") != "no-store" {
+		t.Fatal("missing cache protection")
+	}
+}
+func TestHydraRedirectCannotLeaveTrustedOrigin(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, target := range []string{"https://evil.example/oauth2/auth", "https://[email protected]/oauth2/auth", "https://hydra.example/other"} {
+		admin := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"redirect_to": target})
+		}))
+		a := &app{admin: admin.URL, public: "https://hydra.example", client: admin.Client()}
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		a.accept(w, httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://login.example/login", nil), "login", "challenge", map[string]string{"subject": "human:test"})
+		if w.Code != 502 || strings.Contains(w.Header().Get("Location"), "evil") {
+			t.Fatal("untrusted redirect accepted")
+		}
+		admin.Close()
+	}
+}

apps/hydra/login-deployment.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: hydra-login
+  namespace: hydra
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  strategy:
+    type: Recreate
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: hydra-login
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app: hydra-login
+    spec:
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
+      securityContext:
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        runAsUser: 65532
+        runAsGroup: 65532
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      containers:
+      - name: login-consent
+        image: zot.ad.ddupan.top/iam/oidc-login-consent@sha256:fede9b9e93c457c4b7a8a6022d9df86ff5d5900d3f6b6c4f3439851a0ae1e944
+        env:
+        - name: HYDRA_ADMIN_URL
+          value: http://hydra-admin.hydra.svc.cluster.local:4445
+        - name: HYDRA_PUBLIC_URL
+          value: https://hydra.ad.ddupan.top
+        - name: UPSTREAM_ISSUER
+          value: https://auth.ddupan.top
+        - name: UPSTREAM_CLIENT_ID
+          value: hydra-login
+        - name: CALLBACK_URL
+          value: https://hydra-login.ad.ddupan.top/callback
+        - name: ALLOWED_CLIENTS
+          value: gitea
+        - name: UPSTREAM_CLIENT_SECRET
+          valueFrom:
+            secretKeyRef:
+              name: hydra
+              key: upstream_client_secret
+        ports:
+        - name: http
+          containerPort: 8080
+        resources:
+          requests:
+            cpu: 50m
+            memory: 64Mi
+          limits:
+            memory: 256Mi
+        securityContext:
+          allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+          readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+          capabilities:
+            drop:
+            - ALL
+        readinessProbe:
+          httpGet:
+            path: /healthz
+            port: http
+        livenessProbe:
+          httpGet:
+            path: /healthz
+            port: http
+          initialDelaySeconds: 10

apps/hydra/namespace.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: hydra
+  labels:
+    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted

apps/hydra/networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: hydra
+  namespace: hydra
+spec:
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: hydra
+  policyTypes:
+  - Ingress
+  ingress:
+  - from:
+    - namespaceSelector:
+        matchLabels:
+          kubernetes.io/metadata.name: envoy-gateway-system
+    ports:
+    - port: 4444
+      protocol: TCP
+  - from:
+    - podSelector:
+        matchLabels:
+          app: hydra-login
+    ports:
+    - port: 4445
+      protocol: TCP
+---
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: hydra-login
+  namespace: hydra
+spec:
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: hydra-login
+  policyTypes:
+  - Ingress
+  ingress:
+  - from:
+    - namespaceSelector:
+        matchLabels:
+          kubernetes.io/metadata.name: envoy-gateway-system
+    ports:
+    - port: 8080
+      protocol: TCP

apps/hydra/services.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: hydra-public
+  namespace: hydra
+spec:
+  selector:
+    app: hydra
+  ports:
+  - port: 4444
+    targetPort: 4444
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: hydra-admin
+  namespace: hydra
+spec:
+  selector:
+    app: hydra
+  ports:
+  - port: 4445
+    targetPort: 4445
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: hydra-login
+  namespace: hydra
+spec:
+  selector:
+    app: hydra-login
+  ports:
+  - port: 8080
+    targetPort: 8080

apps/nexus/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+# Nexus Repository POC
+
+本目录声明一个 Nexus Repository Community Edition POC，用来验证一次性 CI runner 通过
+网络服务复用 Ansible Galaxy、Go Modules 与 OCI/BuildKit 缓存。Nexus 固定为 `3.96.1`，
+镜像固定到官方 multi-arch index digest；LAN 入口为
+`https://nexus.ad.ddupan.top`。
+
+## POC 边界
+
+- 单副本 Deployment，`Recreate` 更新，避免一个 RWO 卷被两个 Pod 同时挂载。
+- `/nexus-data` 使用 `localpv-zfs-ceph` 上的 50 GiB RWO PVC。
+- 资源预算为 250m/2 GiB request、2 CPU/4 GiB limit；JVM heap 上限 2 GiB。
+- 使用容器默认的 embedded H2。它只用于 POC；正式接管 OCI 制品前必须迁移到外部
+  PostgreSQL，并验证备份恢复。
+- 入口只在 LAN wildcard Gateway 上发布，不创建公网 DNS 或 Cloudflare route。
+- 不套 Authelia forward-auth；它会破坏 Go、Ansible 与 OCI 非浏览器客户端。
+- 现有 zot 保持不变。Nexus 完成 OCI、BuildKit cache 和恢复验收前不得迁移或删除 zot。
+
+Terraform provider 创建 `ansible-public`、`go-public`、最小匿名权限与 OCI Bearer Token
+Realm。Nexus 3.94 才加入的原生 OCI repository 已有 REST API，但当前锁定的 community
+provider 尚未暴露 OCI resource；`terraform/reconcile-oci.sh` 因此根据 3.96.1 实例 Swagger
+固定的 JSON schema，幂等调和 `oci-hosted`、`oci-proxy` 与 `oci-public`。不得绕过该入口在
+UI 中创建无人管理的长期 repository。
+
+## 部署
+
+Flux 从 `clusters/homelab/apps/nexus.yaml` 协调本目录，并依赖 Envoy Gateway 与 OpenEBS。
+合并前只渲染配置，不直接 apply：
+
+```bash
+kubectl kustomize apps/nexus
+```
+
+合并并由 Flux 部署后检查：
+
+```bash
+kubectl -n flux-system get kustomization nexus
+kubectl -n nexus get pod,pvc,service,httproute
+kubectl -n nexus logs deployment/nexus --tail=100
+```
+
+启动可能需要数分钟，startup probe 允许最多十分钟。不要因初次启动较慢反复删除 Pod；
+先确认 PVC 已 Bound、Pod 没有 OOM，以及日志仍在推进。
+
+DNS 期望状态已加入 `infrastructure/dns/records.yml`，需从 Samba AD Ansible root 以
+`--check --diff` 核对后再按其 README 应用 DNS tag。没有 DNS 时可先用 port-forward
+验证应用，但不能据此宣称 Gateway 路径已通过。
+
+## 首次初始化与 Terraform
+
+初始管理员密码生成在 PVC 的 `/nexus-data/admin.password`。只在交互式终端中读取并立即
+完成首次密码轮换；不得把密码复制进 shell tracing、工单、Git 或命令参数。随后将
+Terraform 管理账号的凭据存入 OpenBao，由 CI 通过 Terraform input variable 注入以下
+环境变量：
+
+```text
+TF_VAR_nexus_url=https://nexus.ad.ddupan.top
+TF_VAR_nexus_username=admin
+TF_VAR_nexus_password=<OpenBao kv/infra/nexus 的 admin_password 字段>
+```
+
+`terraform/` 使用 `sonatype-nexus-community/sonatyperepo` 1.17.0，当前声明：
+
+- `ansible-galaxy-proxy` → `https://galaxy.ansible.com`
+- `ansible-public` group
+- `go-proxy` → `https://proxy.golang.org`
+- `go-public` group
+
+provider credential 不写入 HCL 或 tfvars。正式 apply 前还必须为这个独立 Terraform root
+配置远端 backend；本地 state 只允许用于可丢弃的 POC，不提交。验证命令：
+
+```bash
+terraform -chdir=apps/nexus/terraform init -backend=false
+terraform -chdir=apps/nexus/terraform validate
+```
+
+先以 `--check` 查看 OCI repository 漂移，再明确 apply；脚本只从上述环境变量取得凭据，
+用临时 `0600` netrc 调用 REST API，退出时删除：
+
+```bash
+apps/nexus/terraform/reconcile-oci.sh --check
+apps/nexus/terraform/reconcile-oci.sh --apply
+```
+
+Terraform 同时把内置 `anonymous` 用户从默认的全仓库 `nx-anonymous` 角色收窄到
+`ansible-public`、其返回制品 URL 使用的 `ansible-galaxy-proxy`、`go-public`，以及
+`oci-public`/`oci-proxy` 的 `browse/read` 权限。`oci-hosted` 不向匿名用户开放。首次接管
+已有实例时先执行
+`terraform import sonatyperepo_user.anonymous anonymous,default`，再 apply；不要先启用默认的
+全仓库匿名读取。
+
+2026-09-20 的 POC 现场验收已确认：Flux 与 Pod Ready、PVC Bound、HTTPRoute 通过 HTTPS
+返回 Nexus 状态 200，Samba DNS 已幂等收敛。全新客户端目录通过匿名入口下载
+`community.general:11.2.0` 时冷缓存为 8.49 秒、热缓存为 1.89 秒，两次 tarball SHA-256
+一致；`golang.org/x/[email protected]` 为 2.92 秒与 1.51 秒。
+
+## 客户端验收
+
+先验证冷缓存，再原样重复命令验证热缓存；记录 Nexus 请求、上游流量和耗时，不只观察
+命令成功。Ansible 配置的 URL 必须以 `/` 结尾：
+
+```ini
+[galaxy]
+server_list = nexus
+
+[galaxy_server.nexus]
+url = https://nexus.ad.ddupan.top/repository/ansible-public/
+```
+
+```bash
+ansible-galaxy collection install -r collections/requirements.yml \
+  -p .ansible/collections
+```
+
+Go POC 使用：
+
+```bash
+GOPROXY=https://nexus.ad.ddupan.top/repository/go-public/ go mod download
+```
+
+私有 `git.ddupan.top/*` module 的 `GOPRIVATE`、凭据与是否允许 `direct` fallback 在实际
+workflow 中单独决定；不要让私有 module path 意外发往公共 proxy。
+
+OCI 使用 path-based routing：匿名公共拉取地址形如
+`nexus.ad.ddupan.top/oci-public/library/alpine:3.22`，认证写入地址形如
+`nexus.ad.ddupan.top/oci-hosted/<namespace>/<image>:<tag>`。2026-09-20 现场验收结果：
+
+- `oci-public` 匿名代理拉取 Alpine 冷缓存 4.75 秒、热缓存 0.80 秒，digest 一致；
+- `oci-hosted` 认证 push/pull 成功，匿名 pull 返回 401；
+- amd64/arm64 OCI image index push 成功，两个平台 manifest 可见；
+- Helm chart push/pull digest 与本地 tarball SHA-256 一致；
+- Cosign 3.1.3 使用一次性密钥签名并验证成功，OCI 1.1 referrers API 返回一个
+  `application/vnd.dev.sigstore.bundle.v0.3+json` artifact；
+- BuildKit `registry` cache 以 `mode=max` 导出成功，销毁首个 builder 后由新 builder 导入，
+  两个 `RUN` step 均明确命中 `CACHED`。
+
+本机安装的测试客户端包括 `/usr/local/bin/cosign` 3.1.3；安装时核对官方 Linux amd64
+binary SHA-256 `4629c757b7618056f8ddd7e2625ae9fdd94c0372a65049520bc7d9df9efc7f71`。
+上述结果仍不代表备份恢复、外部 PostgreSQL 或正式 publisher service account 已完成；
+这些项目通过前不得迁移或删除 zot。
+
+## 数据与恢复
+
+POC 的数据库、配置、blob、初始管理员状态都位于 `nexus-data` PVC。删除 Deployment
+不会删除 PVC；删除 PVC 会永久删除整个 POC。当前没有独立备份，不能将它用于唯一副本的
+正式制品。
+
+恢复验证至少包括：停止写入、取得一致备份、在独立 PVC/实例恢复、登录、列出 repository、
+拉取已缓存的 Ansible/Go 制品，并核对 OCI digest/referrers。正式化时再把数据库迁移至
+外部 PostgreSQL，并分别定义数据库与 blob 的备份、恢复顺序和 RPO。
+
+参考：
+
+- [Nexus OCI repositories](https://help.sonatype.com/en/oci-repositories.html)
+- [Nexus Ansible repositories](https://help.sonatype.com/en/ansible-repositories.html)
+- [Nexus Go repositories](https://help.sonatype.com/en/go-repositories.html)
+- [官方容器镜像](https://hub.docker.com/r/sonatype/nexus3)

apps/nexus/deployment.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: nexus
+  namespace: nexus
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: nexus
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  strategy:
+    type: Recreate
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: nexus
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: nexus
+    spec:
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
+      securityContext:
+        fsGroup: 200
+        fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
+        runAsGroup: 200
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        runAsUser: 200
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 120
+      containers:
+        - name: nexus
+          image: docker.io/sonatype/nexus3:3.96.1@sha256:56142f13432cf072e017aebb2025f201e42ae36ff40bb82618c702504c61f7dd
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
+          env:
+            - name: INSTALL4J_ADD_VM_PARAMS
+              value: >-
+                -Xms1024m -Xmx2048m -XX:MaxDirectMemorySize=1024m
+                -Djava.util.prefs.userRoot=/nexus-data/javaprefs
+          ports:
+            - name: http
+              containerPort: 8081
+              protocol: TCP
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 250m
+              memory: 2Gi
+            limits:
+              cpu: "2"
+              memory: 4Gi
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            capabilities:
+              drop:
+                - ALL
+          startupProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /service/rest/v1/status
+              port: http
+            failureThreshold: 60
+            periodSeconds: 10
+            timeoutSeconds: 5
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /service/rest/v1/status
+              port: http
+            failureThreshold: 6
+            periodSeconds: 10
+            timeoutSeconds: 5
+          livenessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /service/rest/v1/status
+              port: http
+            failureThreshold: 6
+            periodSeconds: 30
+            timeoutSeconds: 5
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: data
+              mountPath: /nexus-data
+      volumes:
+        - name: data
+          persistentVolumeClaim:
+            claimName: nexus-data

apps/nexus/httproute.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  name: nexus
+  namespace: nexus
+spec:
+  parentRefs:
+    - name: eg
+      namespace: envoy-gateway-system
+      sectionName: https
+  hostnames:
+    - nexus.ad.ddupan.top
+  rules:
+    - backendRefs:
+        - name: nexus
+          port: 8081

apps/nexus/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - namespace.yaml
+  - pvc.yaml
+  - deployment.yaml
+  - service.yaml
+  - httproute.yaml
+  - networkpolicy.yaml

apps/nexus/namespace.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: nexus
+  labels:
+    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
+    pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit: restricted
+    pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: restricted

apps/nexus/networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: nexus-ingress
+  namespace: nexus
+spec:
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: nexus
+  policyTypes:
+    - Ingress
+  ingress:
+    - from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: envoy-gateway-system
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              gateway.envoyproxy.io/owning-gateway-name: eg
+              gateway.envoyproxy.io/owning-gateway-namespace: envoy-gateway-system
+      ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 8081

apps/nexus/pvc.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: nexus-data
+  namespace: nexus
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+    - ReadWriteOnce
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 50Gi
+  storageClassName: localpv-zfs-ceph

apps/nexus/service.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: nexus
+  namespace: nexus
+spec:
+  type: ClusterIP
+  selector:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: nexus
+  ports:
+    - name: http
+      port: 8081
+      protocol: TCP
+      targetPort: http

apps/nexus/terraform/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+.terraform/
+*.tfstate
+*.tfstate.*
+*.tfplan
+crash.log
+crash.*.log

apps/nexus/terraform/.terraform.lock.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# This file is maintained automatically by "terraform init".
+# Manual edits may be lost in future updates.
+
+provider "registry.terraform.io/sonatype-nexus-community/sonatyperepo" {
+  version     = "1.17.0"
+  constraints = "1.17.0"
+  hashes = [
+    "h1:uKhvhhhI7B+HBsh0zq/ybqKt+EnOGyI6rjcRCtj79ZA=",
+    "zh:0dde99e7b343fa01f8eefc378171fb8621bedb20f59157d6cc8e3d46c738105f",
+    "zh:3315929df254a3a6ac27c8c846c2006f7d2a91fadc014351bc4d617f948e5bf9",
+    "zh:36be5a455af3ce4e187de26753de63e78c1ee9a32dba0135c6cf96a6c1fff25f",
+    "zh:3f73f7ff57b8c339a7c7ac37653e2dc0b2dd9dcc3f3a538788e7e3ac838337b2",
+    "zh:40286ecca4c22ab7ae90618ac6d2743f5055199dac81cf5204a4a397c784d439",
+    "zh:4d24e5c0195fb3155b1967583ee64cfeda402d7cc7f3c73369438f6c69f4245b",
+    "zh:828a9d7aceaac36af7f9c07af43ec8d20a89148780645d170ffb1c68b2da792d",
+    "zh:a5ab04de3fe626ec57c832618c6f990abd6610f81e132621651e0b180b970cff",
+    "zh:a959fa6090a8c0f53739879184e7346423494aee598003df0d1ab4a22b2eee91",
+    "zh:bdda26c2f03f918bbe59e75abea44868fafda019c3a543725331195df126350b",
+    "zh:d8048e149ee97ba62971e6a79355d59887bc6d10fcf72cc2feff3d0a2582670c",
+    "zh:dd36f9988af4e1ca5b1ca7b7bb6f658df9a220dfcda7fec7392fedfe9064f652",
+    "zh:dda2688d46c7e539fe97e8fe9d3ec81fb364170e018d9c6a681364c8955d4e9d",
+    "zh:e6b519afe2dea1c0434f766eb6bc9ba78cc5b6ef2c311c2ca3c65cb24744f31f",
+  ]
+}

apps/nexus/terraform/oci/oci-hosted.json

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+{
+  "name": "oci-hosted",
+  "online": true,
+  "storage": {
+    "blobStoreName": "default",
+    "strictContentTypeValidation": true,
+    "writePolicy": "ALLOW",
+    "latestPolicy": false
+  },
+  "oci": {
+    "v1Enabled": false,
+    "forceBasicAuth": false,
+    "pathEnabled": true
+  },
+  "component": { "proprietaryComponents": false },
+  "cosign": { "enforcement": "NONE" }
+}

apps/nexus/terraform/oci/oci-proxy.json

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+  "name": "oci-proxy",
+  "online": true,
+  "storage": {
+    "blobStoreName": "default",
+    "strictContentTypeValidation": true
+  },
+  "oci": {
+    "v1Enabled": false,
+    "forceBasicAuth": false,
+    "pathEnabled": true
+  },
+  "ociProxy": {
+    "indexType": "HUB",
+    "cacheForeignLayers": false,
+    "foreignLayerUrlWhitelist": []
+  },
+  "proxy": {
+    "remoteUrl": "https://registry-1.docker.io",
+    "contentMaxAge": 1440,
+    "metadataMaxAge": 60,
+    "preserveEncodedCharacters": false
+  },
+  "negativeCache": { "enabled": true, "timeToLive": 60 },
+  "httpClient": { "blocked": false, "autoBlock": true },
+  "cosign": { "enforcement": "NONE" }
+}

apps/nexus/terraform/oci/oci-public.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "name": "oci-public",
+  "online": true,
+  "storage": {
+    "blobStoreName": "default",
+    "strictContentTypeValidation": true
+  },
+  "group": { "memberNames": ["oci-proxy"] },
+  "oci": {
+    "v1Enabled": false,
+    "forceBasicAuth": false,
+    "pathEnabled": true
+  },
+  "cosign": { "enforcement": "NONE" }
+}

apps/nexus/terraform/reconcile-oci.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+mode="${1:---check}"
+case "$mode" in
+  --check | --apply) ;;
+  *) echo "usage: $0 [--check|--apply]" >&2; exit 2 ;;
+esac
+
+: "${TF_VAR_nexus_url:?set TF_VAR_nexus_url}"
+: "${TF_VAR_nexus_username:?set TF_VAR_nexus_username}"
+: "${TF_VAR_nexus_password:?set TF_VAR_nexus_password}"
+
+script_dir="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+auth_file="$(mktemp /tmp/nexus-oci-auth.XXXXXX)"
+trap 'rm -f -- "$auth_file"' EXIT
+chmod 0600 "$auth_file"
+printf 'machine %s\nlogin %s\npassword %s\n' \
+  "${TF_VAR_nexus_url#*://}" "$TF_VAR_nexus_username" \
+  "$TF_VAR_nexus_password" >"$auth_file"
+
+drift=0
+for entry in \
+  "hosted:$script_dir/oci/oci-hosted.json" \
+  "proxy:$script_dir/oci/oci-proxy.json" \
+  "group:$script_dir/oci/oci-public.json"; do
+  repository_type="${entry%%:*}"
+  desired_file="${entry#*:}"
+  repository_name="$(jq -er '.name' "$desired_file")"
+  endpoint="$TF_VAR_nexus_url/service/rest/v1/repositories/oci/$repository_type"
+  current_file="$(mktemp /tmp/nexus-oci-current.XXXXXX)"
+
+  status="$(curl --silent --show-error --netrc-file "$auth_file" \
+    --output "$current_file" --write-out '%{http_code}' \
+    "$endpoint/$repository_name")"
+
+  if [[ "$status" == 404 ]]; then
+    drift=1
+    if [[ "$mode" == --apply ]]; then
+      curl --fail --silent --show-error --netrc-file "$auth_file" \
+        --header 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+        --data-binary "@$desired_file" "$endpoint"
+      echo "created $repository_name"
+    else
+      echo "missing $repository_name" >&2
+    fi
+  elif [[ "$status" == 200 ]]; then
+    if jq -e --slurpfile desired "$desired_file" '
+      def subset($actual; $wanted):
+        if ($wanted | type) == "object" then
+          all($wanted | keys[];
+            ($actual[.] != null) and subset($actual[.]; $wanted[.]))
+        else
+          $actual == $wanted
+        end;
+      subset(.; $desired[0])
+    ' "$current_file" >/dev/null; then
+      echo "in sync $repository_name"
+    else
+      drift=1
+      if [[ "$mode" == --apply ]]; then
+        curl --fail --silent --show-error --netrc-file "$auth_file" \
+          --request PUT --header 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+          --data-binary "@$desired_file" "$endpoint/$repository_name"
+        echo "updated $repository_name"
+      else
+        echo "drifted $repository_name" >&2
+      fi
+    fi
+  else
+    cat "$current_file" >&2
+    echo "unexpected HTTP $status for $repository_name" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  rm -f -- "$current_file"
+done
+
+if [[ "$mode" == --check && "$drift" -ne 0 ]]; then
+  exit 1
+fi

apps/nexus/terraform/repositories.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+locals {
+  proxy_http_client = {
+    auto_block = true
+    blocked    = false
+  }
+
+  proxy_negative_cache = {
+    enabled      = true
+    time_to_live = 60
+  }
+
+  repository_storage = {
+    blob_store_name                = "default"
+    strict_content_type_validation = true
+  }
+}
+
+resource "sonatyperepo_repository_ansiblegalaxy_proxy" "galaxy" {
+  name   = "ansible-galaxy-proxy"
+  online = true
+
+  http_client    = local.proxy_http_client
+  negative_cache = local.proxy_negative_cache
+  proxy = {
+    remote_url       = "https://galaxy.ansible.com"
+    content_max_age  = 1440
+    metadata_max_age = 60
+  }
+  storage = local.repository_storage
+}
+
+resource "sonatyperepo_repository_ansiblegalaxy_group" "public" {
+  name   = "ansible-public"
+  online = true
+
+  group = {
+    member_names = [sonatyperepo_repository_ansiblegalaxy_proxy.galaxy.name]
+  }
+  storage = local.repository_storage
+}
+
+resource "sonatyperepo_repository_go_proxy" "public" {
+  name   = "go-proxy"
+  online = true
+
+  http_client    = local.proxy_http_client
+  negative_cache = local.proxy_negative_cache
+  proxy = {
+    remote_url       = "https://proxy.golang.org"
+    content_max_age  = 1440
+    metadata_max_age = 60
+  }
+  storage = local.repository_storage
+}
+
+resource "sonatyperepo_repository_go_group" "public" {
+  name   = "go-public"
+  online = true
+
+  group = {
+    member_names = [sonatyperepo_repository_go_proxy.public.name]
+  }
+  storage = local.repository_storage
+}

apps/nexus/terraform/security.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+resource "sonatyperepo_privilege_repository_view" "anonymous_ansible" {
+  name        = "ci-anonymous-ansible-read"
+  description = "Anonymous read access to the Ansible Galaxy group"
+  actions     = ["BROWSE", "READ"]
+  format      = "ansiblegalaxy"
+  repository  = sonatyperepo_repository_ansiblegalaxy_group.public.name
+}
+
+resource "sonatyperepo_privilege_repository_view" "anonymous_ansible_proxy" {
+  name        = "ci-anonymous-ansible-proxy-read"
+  description = "Anonymous artifact read access to the Ansible Galaxy proxy"
+  actions     = ["BROWSE", "READ"]
+  format      = "ansiblegalaxy"
+  repository  = sonatyperepo_repository_ansiblegalaxy_proxy.galaxy.name
+}
+
+resource "sonatyperepo_privilege_repository_view" "anonymous_go" {
+  name        = "ci-anonymous-go-read"
+  description = "Anonymous read access to the Go module group"
+  actions     = ["BROWSE", "READ"]
+  format      = "go"
+  repository  = sonatyperepo_repository_go_group.public.name
+}
+
+resource "sonatyperepo_privilege_repository_view" "anonymous_oci_public" {
+  name        = "ci-anonymous-oci-public-read"
+  description = "Anonymous read access to the public OCI group"
+  actions     = ["BROWSE", "READ"]
+  format      = "oci"
+  repository  = "oci-public"
+}
+
+resource "sonatyperepo_privilege_repository_view" "anonymous_oci_proxy" {
+  name        = "ci-anonymous-oci-proxy-read"
+  description = "Anonymous read access to the OCI proxy member"
+  actions     = ["BROWSE", "READ"]
+  format      = "oci"
+  repository  = "oci-proxy"
+}
+
+resource "sonatyperepo_role" "anonymous_ci" {
+  id          = "ci-anonymous-read"
+  name        = "CI anonymous read"
+  description = "Read-only access to public CI dependency proxy groups"
+  privileges = [
+    sonatyperepo_privilege_repository_view.anonymous_ansible.name,
+    sonatyperepo_privilege_repository_view.anonymous_ansible_proxy.name,
+    sonatyperepo_privilege_repository_view.anonymous_go.name,
+    sonatyperepo_privilege_repository_view.anonymous_oci_public.name,
+    sonatyperepo_privilege_repository_view.anonymous_oci_proxy.name,
+  ]
+  roles = []
+}
+
+resource "sonatyperepo_user" "anonymous" {
+  user_id       = "anonymous"
+  first_name    = "Anonymous"
+  last_name     = "User"
+  email_address = "[email protected]"
+  status        = "active"
+  roles         = [sonatyperepo_role.anonymous_ci.id]
+}
+
+resource "sonatyperepo_system_anonymous_access" "ci" {
+  enabled    = true
+  user_id    = sonatyperepo_user.anonymous.user_id
+  realm_name = "NexusAuthorizingRealm"
+}
+
+resource "sonatyperepo_security_realms" "active" {
+  active = [
+    "NexusAuthenticatingRealm",
+    "OciBearerToken",
+  ]
+}

apps/nexus/terraform/versions.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+terraform {
+  required_version = ">= 1.11.0"
+
+  required_providers {
+    sonatyperepo = {
+      source  = "sonatype-nexus-community/sonatyperepo"
+      version = "1.17.0"
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+provider "sonatyperepo" {
+  url      = var.nexus_url
+  username = var.nexus_username
+  password = var.nexus_password
+}
+
+variable "nexus_url" {
+  description = "Nexus Repository base URL"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "nexus_username" {
+  description = "Nexus Terraform management username"
+  type        = string
+  sensitive   = true
+}
+
+variable "nexus_password" {
+  description = "Nexus Terraform management password"
+  type        = string
+  sensitive   = true
+}

apps/ps3netsrv/docker-compose.yml

@@ -18,4 +18,4 @@ networks:
   default:
     ipam:
       config:
-      - subnet: 172.28.1.0/24
+        - subnet: 172.28.1.0/24

apps/zot/values.yaml

@@ -70,11 +70,11 @@ configFiles:
         },
         "accessControl": {
           "repositories": {
-            "panxiao81/gitea-dynamic-runner-controller": {
+            "panxiao81/backstage": {
               "policies": [
                 {
                   "users": [
-                    "spiffe://ddupan.top/ci/panxiao81/gitea-dynamic-runner/publish-images",
+                    "spiffe://ddupan.top/ci/panxiao81/backstage/image",
                     "spiffe://ddupan.top/dev/panxiao81"
                   ],
                   "actions": [
@@ -88,18 +88,42 @@ configFiles:
                 "read"
               ]
             },
-            "panxiao81/gitea-dynamic-runner-runner": {
+            "panxiao81/gitea-dynamic-runner-controller": {
               "policies": [
                 {
                   "users": [
-                    "spiffe://ddupan.top/ci/panxiao81/gitea-dynamic-runner/publish-images",
-                    "spiffe://ddupan.top/dev/panxiao81"
+                    "spiffe://ddupan.top/ci/panxiao81/gitea-dynamic-runner/publish-images"
                   ],
                   "actions": [
                     "read",
                     "create",
                     "update"
                   ]
+                },
+                {
+                  "users": ["spiffe://ddupan.top/dev/panxiao81"],
+                  "actions": ["read", "create", "update", "delete"]
+                }
+              ],
+              "defaultPolicy": [
+                "read"
+              ]
+            },
+            "panxiao81/gitea-dynamic-runner-runner": {
+              "policies": [
+                {
+                  "users": [
+                    "spiffe://ddupan.top/ci/panxiao81/gitea-dynamic-runner/publish-images"
+                  ],
+                  "actions": [
+                    "read",
+                    "create",
+                    "update"
+                  ]
+                },
+                {
+                  "users": ["spiffe://ddupan.top/dev/panxiao81"],
+                  "actions": ["read", "create", "update", "delete"]
                 }
               ],
               "defaultPolicy": [

clusters/homelab/README.md

@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ sudo k3s kubectl -n flux-system get gitrepositories,kustomizations
 - VictoriaMetrics Operator 已固定现有 chart `0.66.2` 并完成分阶段 Flux HelmRelease
   接管；Metrics、Logs、Traces 与 Grafana 也已统一完成 Flux 接管；
 - External Secrets Operator 已固定 chart `2.8.0` 并完成分阶段接管；
-- SPIRE 已按官方 hardened chart `0.30.2`（SPIRE `1.15.3`）声明，使用共享
+- SPIRE 已按 hardened chart 内部 fork `0.30.2-ddupan.1`（基于上游 `0.30.2`，SPIRE
+  `1.15.3`）声明，使用共享
   PostgreSQL 与独立 signing-key PVC；首次上线和 OpenBao JWT-SVID PoC 尚待合并后验证；
+- Nexus Repository CE POC 已加入 GitOps 声明，计划验证 Ansible Galaxy、Go Modules 与
+  OCI/BuildKit 缓存；尚未部署或完成现场验收，现有 zot 保持不变；
 - root Kustomization 与所有 brownfield 子 Kustomization 继续保持 `prune: false`。

clusters/homelab/apps/backstage.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: backstage
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: envoy-gateway
+    - name: external-secrets
+  healthChecks:
+    - apiVersion: apps/v1
+      kind: Deployment
+      name: backstage
+      namespace: backstage
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./apps/backstage
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  timeout: 5m
+  wait: true

clusters/homelab/apps/dynamic-runner.yaml

@@ -6,11 +6,12 @@ metadata:
 spec:
   dependsOn:
     - name: external-secrets
-    - name: nats
     - name: spire
   interval: 10m
   path: ./platform/dynamic-runner
-  prune: false
+  # The runner backends are replaceable. Prune is required when a retired
+  # worker is removed from the component; otherwise it keeps consuming work.
+  prune: true
   sourceRef:
     kind: GitRepository
     name: flux-system

clusters/homelab/apps/hydra.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: hydra
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  dependsOn:
+  - name: envoy-gateway
+  - name: external-secrets
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./apps/hydra
+  prune: false
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  timeout: 5m
+  wait: true

clusters/homelab/apps/nexus.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: nexus
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: envoy-gateway
+    - name: openebs
+  healthChecks:
+    - apiVersion: apps/v1
+      kind: Deployment
+      name: nexus
+      namespace: nexus
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./apps/nexus
+  prune: false
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  timeout: 15m
+  wait: true

clusters/homelab/kustomization.yaml

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ resources:
   - apps/envoy-gateway.yaml
   - apps/external-secrets.yaml
   - apps/gitea.yaml
-  - apps/gitea-actions.yaml
+  - apps/backstage.yaml
   - apps/http-echo.yaml
   - apps/openebs.yaml
   - apps/nats.yaml
@@ -15,3 +15,5 @@ resources:
   - apps/spire.yaml
   - apps/observability.yaml
   - apps/zot.yaml
+  - apps/nexus.yaml
+  - apps/hydra.yaml

clusters/sandbox/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# Sandbox 集群
+
+这里是 OpenSandbox、CI 和 AI Agent workload 所在双节点 k3s 集群的 Flux
+reconciliation 入口。LXC、PostgreSQL、K3s、固定版本的 Flux controllers 与 root
+sync 由 `infrastructure/sandbox-cluster/` 中的 Ansible 管理；本目录只组合集群内
+workload。
+
+Flux 通过 `https://git.ddupan.top/panxiao81/homelab-infra.git` 读取公开仓库。
+Ansible 将 homelab CA 注入 `GitRepository/flux-system` 引用的同名 Secret，不使用
+长期 Git 凭据。root Kustomization 从 `./clusters/sandbox` 开始 reconciliation，
+初始保持 `prune: false`。
+
+Root bootstrap 已完成。后续按依赖顺序分别引入：
+
+1. 监控 CRD、kube-state-metrics 以及 kubelet/cAdvisor 抓取配置；
+2. SPIRE Agent、SPIFFE CSI Driver 与 workload registration；
+3. Kata Containers、`block-plain` RuntimeClass；
+4. 独立 External Secrets Operator 与 sandbox 专用 OpenBao auth backend；
+5. OpenSandbox controller/server；CI Pool 与 runner 调度器随后独立接入。
+
+每一阶段单独合并并等待对应 Flux Kustomization Ready，不在 bootstrap 时一次性部署。
+第一阶段监控拆为 `monitoring-operator` 与依赖它的 `monitoring`，防止 VM CR 在
+VictoriaMetrics Operator CRD Ready 前进入 reconciliation。
+
+SPIRE 阶段先由 `spire-bootstrap` 安装 CRD，并声明按上游 k8s_psat Server plugin
+要求收窄的 reviewer：它可以调用 TokenReview，并只读查询用于证明的 Pod 与 Node。
+Agent ServiceAccount 留给后续 HelmRelease 创建，避免两个声明方争夺同一资源。随后运行
+`infrastructure/sandbox-cluster/ansible/spire-bootstrap.yml`：playbook 从 sandbox
+读取 reviewer token，在内存中组成受限 kubeconfig，再通过 stdin reconcile 到 central
+集群的 `spire-server/spire-external-kubeconfigs` Secret。凭据不写入仓库、日志或控制机
+文件；该 Secret 准备完成后，才能启用 central external PSAT/controller-manager 和
+sandbox Agent/CSI。
+
+External controller-manager 使用独立的 `spire-controller-manager` ServiceAccount；其
+RBAC 与上游 controller-manager 所需权限一致，用于读取 workload selectors、维护
+SPIFFE CR status/finalizer 和 leader election。它不复用只允许 TokenReview 的 Server
+reviewer。Ansible 将两份 kubeconfig 写入同一个 central Secret 的不同 key，便于 central
+chart 分别绑定 `sandbox` 与 `sandbox-controller`。
+
+Central SPIRE Server 通过内网 `spire-server.ad.ddupan.top:8081` 接收 sandbox Agent
+attestation。Server 使用 external bundle publisher 持续维护 sandbox
+`spire-system/spire-bundle`，Agent 不固定或复制 trust bundle。Sandbox HelmRelease
+显式关闭 Server 与 OIDC Provider，只部署 Agent DaemonSet 和 SPIFFE CSI Driver；因此
+不会产生第二个 trust root。
+
+`spire-smoke` namespace、ServiceAccount 和 `sandbox-spire-smoke` ClusterSPIFFEID 只用于
+普通 Pod 的 CSI 回归夹具，稳定身份为 `spiffe://ddupan.top/sandbox/smoke`。Kata guest
+不能复用 node Agent 暴露的 Unix socket；virtio-fs 只能呈现 socket 路径，不能把连接
+跨过 VM 边界。Kata workload 必须使用 guest 内 Agent，具体约束见
+`platform/sandbox-kata/README.md`。测试 Pod 临时创建并在验收后删除，普通 Pod 的身份
+声明保留。
+
+Kata 阶段使用官方 4.1.0 `kata-deploy` chart 的短生命周期 `job` 模式，逐节点安装并
+重启 K3s。只启用 `kata-clh-runtime-rs`，不创建默认 `kata` 别名；该 handler 的
+`emptyDir` 固定使用 `block-plain`，为 Docker/BuildKit overlay2 与 kind 提供 guest
+内块设备文件系统。详细限制与上线验收见 `platform/sandbox-kata/README.md`。
+
+Sandbox 的 ESO 通过独立 `auth/kubernetes-sandbox` 向 OpenBao 证明 ServiceAccount
+身份，只能读取共享的 `kv/k8s/opensandbox-api`。它不保存 reviewer JWT 或长期 Bao token；相关
+Terraform 与 Flux 边界见 `platform/sandbox-external-secrets/README.md`。
+
+OpenSandbox 阶段固定官方源码 commit 与 umbrella chart `0.2.2`，只部署 controller、
+ClusterIP server 和 CRD。API key 由 ESO 从 OpenBao 投影，明文不进入 Git。
+
+## 监控边界
+
+这里只管理 sandbox LXC 内的 Kubernetes 监控，不负责 PVE 宿主监控。LXC 与宿主共享
+内核，即使 lxcfs 虚拟化了内存和 uptime，容器内 `/proc/stat` 仍是宿主 CPU 视图；
+在 LXC 内运行 node_exporter 会生成混合语义并重复采集宿主指标，因此禁止部署。
+
+Sandbox 节点与 workload 指标来自 kubelet/cAdvisor 和 kube-state-metrics；K3s 或 LXC
+特有但上述接口未覆盖的指标，应使用目标明确的 collector，不以 node_exporter 补齐。

clusters/sandbox/apps/ci-runners.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: ci-runners
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: opensandbox
+    - name: spire-agents
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./platform/sandbox-ci-runners
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  timeout: 20m
+  wait: true

clusters/sandbox/apps/external-secrets-operator.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: external-secrets-operator
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: monitoring-operator
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./platform/sandbox-external-secrets/operator
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  timeout: 10m
+  wait: true

clusters/sandbox/apps/external-secrets.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: external-secrets
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: external-secrets-operator
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./platform/sandbox-external-secrets/config
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  timeout: 10m
+  wait: true

clusters/sandbox/apps/kata.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: kata
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: monitoring-operator
+    - name: spire-agents
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./platform/sandbox-kata
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  timeout: 35m
+  wait: true

clusters/sandbox/apps/monitoring-operator.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+---
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: monitoring-operator
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./platform/sandbox-monitoring/operator
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  timeout: 10m
+  wait: true

clusters/sandbox/apps/monitoring.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: monitoring
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: monitoring-operator
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./platform/sandbox-monitoring/workloads
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  timeout: 10m
+  wait: true

clusters/sandbox/apps/opensandbox.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+---
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: opensandbox
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: external-secrets
+    - name: kata
+    - name: monitoring-operator
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./platform/sandbox-opensandbox
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  timeout: 15m
+  wait: true

clusters/sandbox/apps/spire-agents.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
+kind: Kustomization
+metadata:
+  name: spire-agents
+  namespace: flux-system
+spec:
+  dependsOn:
+    - name: spire-bootstrap
+    - name: monitoring-operator
+  interval: 10m
+  path: ./platform/sandbox-spire/agents
+  prune: true
+  sourceRef:
+    kind: GitRepository
+    name: flux-system
+  timeout: 15m
+  wait: true

clusters/sandbox/apps/spire-bootstrap.yaml

@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
+---
 apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
 kind: Kustomization
 metadata:
-  name: gitea-actions
+  name: spire-bootstrap
   namespace: flux-system
 spec:
   interval: 10m
-  path: ./platform/gitea-runner
-  prune: false
+  path: ./platform/sandbox-spire/bootstrap
+  prune: true
   sourceRef:
     kind: GitRepository
     name: flux-system
-  timeout: 3m
-  wait: false
+  timeout: 10m
+  wait: true

clusters/sandbox/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+---
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - apps/monitoring-operator.yaml
+  - apps/monitoring.yaml
+  - apps/spire-bootstrap.yaml
+  - apps/spire-agents.yaml
+  - apps/kata.yaml
+  - apps/external-secrets-operator.yaml
+  - apps/external-secrets.yaml
+  - apps/opensandbox.yaml
+  - apps/ci-runners.yaml

infrastructure/dns/records.yml

@@ -15,13 +15,21 @@ homelab_dns:
       - { zone: ad.ddupan.top, name: sandbox-k8s, type: A, values: [10.60.0.13] }
       - { zone: ad.ddupan.top, name: retrolab, type: A, values: [10.60.0.10] }
       - { zone: ad.ddupan.top, name: grafana, type: A, values: [192.168.10.127] }
+      - { zone: ad.ddupan.top, name: metrics-write, type: A, values: [192.168.10.127] }
       - { zone: ad.ddupan.top, name: netbox, type: A, values: [192.168.10.127] }
       - { zone: ad.ddupan.top, name: nats, type: A, values: [192.168.10.127] }
+      - { zone: ad.ddupan.top, name: nexus, type: A, values: [192.168.10.127] }
       - { zone: ad.ddupan.top, name: s3, type: A, values: [192.168.10.127] }
+      - { zone: ad.ddupan.top, name: hydra, type: A, values: [192.168.10.127] }
+      - { zone: ad.ddupan.top, name: hydra-login, type: A, values: [192.168.10.127] }
       - { zone: ad.ddupan.top, name: spire-oidc, type: A, values: [192.168.10.127] }
+      - { zone: ad.ddupan.top, name: spire-server, type: A, values: [192.168.10.127] }
       - { zone: ad.ddupan.top, name: zot, type: A, values: [192.168.10.127] }
       - { zone: ad.ddupan.top, name: zot-push, type: A, values: [192.168.10.127] }
 
+      - { zone: ad.ddupan.top, name: pg-prod, type: A, values: [192.168.10.2] }
+      - { zone: ad.ddupan.top, name: pg-dev, type: A, values: [192.168.10.127] }
+
   split_horizon:
     # backends records the current adoption boundary. obj is deliberately not
     # emitted to CoreDNS yet, preserving the current pod resolver behaviour.
@@ -60,14 +68,14 @@ homelab_dns:
       - name: oci-arm.ddupan.top
         type: A
         values:
-        - 129.225.138.179
+          - 129.225.138.179
         proxied: false
         ttl: 300
         terraform: { managed: false }
       - name: oci-amd.ddupan.top
         type: A
         values:
-        - 129.225.176.134
+          - 129.225.176.134
         proxied: false
         ttl: 300
         terraform: { managed: false }

infrastructure/etcd/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+.terraform/
+*.tfstate*
+*.tfplan
+*.tfvars
+!*.tfvars.example
+__pycache__/

infrastructure/etcd/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+# Homelab shared etcd
+
+独立于 PostgreSQL 与 k3s 的三成员协调服务。Ansible 管主机、证书文件和 etcd 账号；
+独立 Terraform root 管现有 Bao PKI 下的签发角色与 policy，不管理 CA 或秘密值。
+旧 Ansible Vault 不在本次迁移范围。
+
+状态：2026-09-25 已部署三成员 etcd，启用 Bao mTLS 和 RBAC；三个端点健康检查通过。
+PVE 两个 LXC 的 rootfs 已通过 `pct move-volume` 从 local-lvm 迁入 `pve-rg` SSD DRBD 池，
+保留容器与 etcd 数据。当前 PVE LXC 迁卷要求停止容器，维护入口按成员串行执行，回归健康后再处理下一个。
+
+| 成员 | 承载 | 地址 | 资源 |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| etcd-laptop | laptop systemd | 192.168.10.127 | MemoryHigh 256 MiB / MemoryMax 384 MiB |
+| etcd-pve1 | pve1 新无特权 LXC 150 | 10.60.0.20 | 1 core / 1536 MiB / 8 GiB SSD DRBD |
+| etcd-pve2 | pve2 新无特权 LXC 151 | 10.60.0.21 | 1 core / 768 MiB / 8 GiB SSD DRBD |
+
+资源限额是初始测试预算，不是已测容量。LXC 已增加 PG standby/备份的独立 HDD mp0 与内存上限，生产 PG standby 与备份仓库已启动。
+etcd 自身的 MemoryHigh/MemoryMax 仍为 256/384 MiB。labnet 依赖现有 VyOS 路由；切换 bare-metal 时复用服务角色，更换主机 inventory。
+
+## 接入方式与认证
+
+客户端使用三个 `https://地址:2379` endpoint，校验 Bao 中央 CA，出示独立客户端证书。
+成员间 2380 也开启 mTLS，额外限制 peer CN 为 `homelab-etcd-peer`。
+管理员证书 CN 为 `root`，只保存在受管成员 root 可读的文件中；对应 etcd root 用户不设置密码。
+服务进程只能读取自己的 server/peer 私钥，不能读取管理员私钥。
+
+Patroni 走 etcd3 gateway，使用无 CN 的客户端证书及独立 username/password 完成 RBAC。
+实测带 CN 的证书会被 gateway 拒绝；管理员 CN=root 证书仅用于原生 etcdctl。
+成员另有无 CN 的 gateway 证书供内部 gateway→gRPC 连接及密码核对使用，不能将管理员证书复用到 HTTP API。首个消费者为
+`patroni-pg-prod`，只允许 `/homelab/patroni/pg-prod/`。其 Bao KV v2 路径为
+`kv/infra/etcd/consumers/patroni-pg-prod`，包含 username/password/prefix；不在本文复制实际值。
+配置 Patroni 时对应 `namespace: /homelab/patroni/` 与 `scope: pg-prod`。
+
+第一次接入应由管理流程交付 CA、客户端证书及秘密引用，然后使用自己的身份对自己的 prefix
+执行一次 put/get/delete。跨 prefix 应被拒绝；不要把 root 证书复制给应用。
+生产消费者证书已签发，Patroni 已接入并验证主从自动切换。
+
+## 安装与维护入口
+
+需要 Ansible、community.crypto，以及目标机 Python/systemd。当前二进制固定为 etcd 3.7.2
+linux-amd64，并固定官方发布资产 SHA-256；版本升级必须单独评估兼容性、备份与 quorum。
+Terraform 使用已登录的 Vault 兼容 provider 身份；Ansible 读取控制端 `BAO_TOKEN` 环境变量，
+token 不下发目标机。`homelab-etcd-provisioner` policy 不自动绑定到现有身份，先由 Bao 管理流程授权。
+
+```bash
+cd infrastructure/etcd/terraform
+terraform init
+terraform plan
+# 审阅计划后 apply；只新增此服务的 PKI roles/policies。
+
+cd ../ansible
+ansible-galaxy collection install -r requirements.yml
+ansible-playbook lxc.yml --check
+ansible-playbook lxc.yml
+ansible-playbook site.yml
+ansible-playbook bootstrap-auth.yml -e etcd_bootstrap_auth=true
+ansible-playbook consumers.yml
+ansible-playbook verify.yml
+```
+
+Terraform 使用现有 S3 tfstate bucket，独立 key `etcd/terraform.tfstate`，启用原生 lockfile；不复用 Bao 的 state。
+从仓库根目录运行 `python3 infrastructure/etcd/run.py terraform <子命令>` 或
+`python3 infrastructure/etcd/run.py ansible <playbook.yml>`，复用当前 Bao 会话并在内存中取得所需凭据。
+`lxc.yml` 是创建入口，不接管已有未知 VMID，也不自动调整运行中容器的网络与容量；配置漂移会报错。
+部署前核对模板与 `pve-rg` 存储可用性、IP 冲突、SSH host key、laptop sudo 和网络访问控制。
+数据库角色不会创建/删除这些 LXC 或 etcd 成员。
+
+`site.yml` 管安装、CSR 本地生成、Bao 签发、配置和逐成员激活。全体健康检查通过才记录激活指纹；
+上次中断后重跑仍能识别尚未激活的磁盘配置。已有集群每个成员激活后检查健康，再处理下一个。
+首次建群先让三个服务启动，再检查 quorum。`bootstrap-auth.yml` 与日常收敛分开，认证已启用时不重建。
+首次认证启用前应限制客户端网络，不能把“已有中央 CA 签名”当作业务授权。
+
+`consumers.yml` 首次生成 48 字符随机密码并以 KV v2 CAS=0 写入，之后只复用。
+元数据存在但数据被删除、Bao 403/超时、或 etcd 用户存在但秘密丢失时均失败，不自动换密码。
+并发 CAS 冲突会中止此次执行，重跑读取胜出的版本。既有额外角色或不同 prefix 权限也报错，
+不默默扩大权限。账号删除、prefix 迁移和密码轮换均不包含在普通收敛里。
+密码使用 stdin 送给 etcdctl，涉及秘密的任务 `no_log: true`；禁止用 `--diff` 打印未来消费者秘密文件。
+
+证书有效期 60 天，`site.yml` 在剩余不足 14 天时续签；需要 Bao 的控制端身份。
+续签 IaC 已实现于 `terraform/renewal.tf`、`controller/` 和 `ansible/controller.yml`：
+独立 cert auth 挂载信任中央 CA，并限制 laptop 的 DNS SAN；用现有 peer 客户端证书登录，
+换取 10 分钟 token，仅允许签发 server/peer/admin/gateway 四类证书，不授予 KV 读取权限。
+控制端每日运行现有健康检查与串行部署，结束撤销 token；不保存长期 token，不依赖人工 OIDC 会话。
+控制程序安装为 root 管理的固定副本，以 panxiao81 身份复用现有 Ansible/SSH/sudo 环境。
+
+**机器身份和 timer 已启用**（2026-09-25）：维护者恢复 OIDC 登录后，Terraform 新增三个
+续签资源，`controller.yml` 登录预检通过。首次实际运行三成员均 `changed=0`，服务 Result=success。
+Bao cert auth 需要非空 CN 作为 identity alias，不能使用无 CN 的 gateway 证书；因此登录使用
+同一主机已有 peer 证书，仍由 `allowed_dns_sans=etcd-laptop` 限制身份，未扩大到其他成员。
+手动触发 `systemctl start homelab-etcd-renew.service`，检查 journal 和
+`/var/lib/homelab-etcd-controller/last-success`；每日 timer 04:10 UTC 加随机延迟。
+本流程也续签自身登录所用 peer 证书；若超过有效期仍未修复，则需要管理身份重新签发。
+成员启动本身仅用本地证书，不实时依赖 Bao。
+
+## 备份与故障处理
+
+每个成员有每日一次的 `homelab-etcd-snapshot.timer`，快照保存在各自
+`/var/backups/homelab-etcd`，root-only，保留最近 3 个成功快照；snapshot status 验证成功才淘汰旧快照。
+首备可执行 `systemctl start homelab-etcd-snapshot.service`，用 journal 和 `etcdutl snapshot status`
+检查，不根据文件名推断备份成功。三处本地快照不等于异地备份。
+
+quota 初始 256 MiB，按 1 小时保留进行自动 compaction；defrag 另择维护窗口逐成员做，
+不能三个成员同时执行。metrics 绑定 loopback 与成员内网地址的 2381 端口，独立 listener 不提供 KV API；
+与既有 LAN exporter 一样通过内网 HTTP 采集，禁止将端口映射到公网。
+现有 VictoriaMetrics 使用 `platform/observability/metrics/scrapes/shared-etcd.yaml` 采集，
+对应 VMRule 覆盖成员不可采集、少于两个可采集成员、无 leader、容量、WAL fsync 和频繁选举。
+采集失败不等于 quorum 丢失，需结合管理员 endpoint health 判断。
+备份年龄、证书到期与续签任务告警尚待补齐。既有 Alertmanager 已接入 Telegram，
+维护者已收到本次成员无 leader 与频繁选举通知；接收器配置由现有监控栈维护。
+
+### DRBD I/O 故障导致成员根卷只读
+
+`SharedEtcdNoLeader` 是单成员指标，不等于全体没有 leader。先检查三个 endpoint，
+并检查宿主机内核的 DRBD quorum、PingAck、I/O error 和 ext4 journal 日志。
+`findmnt` 显示 `rw,emergency_ro` 仍表示文件系统已因错误停止写入；DRBD 恢复 quorum 不会自动修复它。
+
+2026-09-25 17:16 UTC 起，CT150 根卷发生 quorum 短暂丢失、journal I/O 错误和 emergency_ro，
+另外两个 etcd 成员保持健康。期间两个新 HDD 数据卷初始同步伴随多个 DRBD 资源 PingAck 超时。
+只对本项目两个新数据卷设置 `DrbdOptions/PeerDevice/c-max-rate=10240`（10 MiB/s），
+入口为 `../shared-postgresql/ansible/limit-resync.yml`，创建卷流程也复用该任务。
+限速后短期未见新增超时，尚不构成唯一根因证明；未调整全局协议、quorum 或超时。
+
+恢复顺序：确认另外两个成员健康并保存快照，正常停止故障容器，确认根卷卸载、DRBD quorum
+和副本 UpToDate，再执行 `pct fsck 150 --device rootfs --force 1`。fsck 返回 1 表示已修复，
+PVE 包装命令仍会报非零；需再次检查返回 0 才启动容器。不能在已挂载卷上执行 fsck，不能直接强制 remount。
+本次修复后 CT150 启动，三个 endpoint 健康且 Raft term/index 一致；两个容器根卷与 mp0 均可写。
+频繁选举告警含 15 分钟历史窗口，应核对最新计数和健康状态，不通过关闭规则消除通知。
+
+- 单成员故障：先确认其他两成员仍健康，修复原成员；普通部署不删数据目录。
+- 成员永久丢失：需单独执行 member remove/add 流程并同步 inventory，不用重新 init 覆盖。
+- 全集群丢失：先恢复 Bao/信任根与恢复凭据，隔离全部旧成员，用同一有效快照恢复新逻辑集群。
+  开放客户端前逐个协调消费者状态。Patroni 必须核对真实主库、timeline、lease/DCS 状态；
+  不因旧快照宣称某节点为主就允许它写入。完整跨服务灾难恢复演练尚未完成。
+
+## 验证
+
+```bash
+# 本机 loopback 三节点，临时测试 CA 与假的 Bao HTTP 服务，不接触线上秘密。
+ETCD_TEST_BIN=/path/to/etcd-v3.7.2-linux-amd64 python3 tests/integration.py
+cd terraform && terraform validate
+cd ../ansible && ansible-playbook --syntax-check site.yml
+```
+
+集成测试验证实际模板启动、mTLS、认证初始化幂等、消费者幂等、CAS 首次创建、秘密缺失失败关闭、
+prefix 隔离、gateway 账号登录和单成员故障。假 Bao 不验证真实 PKI 签发或中央 policy 的权限，
+也不证明 PVE SSD DRBD 在业务负载下的延迟、systemd 内存预算、在线证书轮换和生产网络符合要求。
+
+源码边界与 PostgreSQL 后续设计见 [研究记录](../shared-postgresql/RESEARCH.md)。
+
+2026-09-25 验证结果：Terraform validate 通过；Ansible lint 零文件级问题；隔离三成员测试通过，
+认证初始化与消费者第二次执行均 `changed=0`，包含 gateway 写入、密码漂移拒绝、快照离线恢复、
+停止一成员后继续写入。测试低负载 RSS 约 36.6–40.4 MiB/成员，仅作开销参考。
+现场验证：Bao PKI roles/policies 已应用，三成员已签发证书并启动；认证初始化与
+`patroni-pg-prod` 账号创建成功，随机密码已保存 Bao，实际 gateway 登录验证通过。
+两台 LXC 的 rootfs 均为 `pve-rg`，运行状态正常；迁移后全部端点成功提交健康探测。
+现有监控已接入；自动续签已启用；备份/证书年龄告警尚待补齐。PostgreSQL 部署状态见其 README。
+
+监控接入验收（2026-09-25）：三个 `up{job="shared-etcd"}` 均为 1，六条规则 health=ok，
+三端点健康检查通过。新增续签调度四项失败/成功路径测试通过，Terraform validate 与 Ansible lint 通过，
+隔离三成员测试再次通过。[IaC PR #159](https://git.ddupan.top/panxiao81/homelab-infra/pulls/159) 已合并。
+2026-09-25 合并后核实：Flux observability Ready，应用版本 `f6d12d6`，
+etcd/PG 的两份 VMRule 与两份 VMStaticScrape 均已纳入 inventory，状态 operational；
+三个 etcd 与两个 Patroni 抓取目标均 up=1，相关 11 条告警 health=ok、inactive。备份/证书年龄告警不包含在这六条规则中。

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/ansible.cfg

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+[defaults]
+inventory = inventory/hosts.yml
+roles_path = roles
+retry_files_enabled = False
+host_key_checking = True
+interpreter_python = auto_silent

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/bootstrap-auth.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+---
+# 与常规 site 分离，防止重建/恢复时默默创建新的认证域。
+- name: 初始化共享 etcd 认证
+  hosts: etcd[0]
+  become: true
+  gather_facts: false
+  pre_tasks:
+    - name: 加载共享默认参数
+      ansible.builtin.import_role:
+        name: shared_etcd
+        tasks_from: context
+  environment:
+    ETCDCTL_ENDPOINTS: "https://{{ etcd_address }}:{{ etcd_client_port }}"
+    ETCDCTL_CACERT: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/ca.crt"
+    ETCDCTL_CERT: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/admin.crt"
+    ETCDCTL_KEY: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/admin.key"
+  tasks:
+    - name: 读取认证状态
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: ["{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcdctl", --write-out=json, auth, status]
+      changed_when: false
+      register: etcd_auth_status
+      check_mode: false
+
+    - name: 初始化管理员与认证
+      when: not ((etcd_auth_status.stdout | from_json).enabled | default(false))
+      block:
+        - name: 要求显式初始化参数
+          ansible.builtin.assert:
+            that: etcd_bootstrap_auth | default(false) | bool
+            fail_msg: 首次初始化需要 -e etcd_bootstrap_auth=true；常规运行不能重建认证。
+
+        - name: 读取现有用户
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: ["{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcdctl", --write-out=json, user, list]
+          changed_when: false
+          register: etcd_users
+
+        - name: 创建仅证书认证的 root 用户
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: ["{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcdctl", user, add, root, --no-password]
+          when: "'root' not in ((etcd_users.stdout | from_json).users | default([], true))"
+          changed_when: true
+
+        - name: 读取管理员角色
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: ["{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcdctl", --write-out=json, user, get, root]
+          changed_when: false
+          register: etcd_root_roles
+
+        - name: 授予 root 管理角色
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: ["{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcdctl", user, grant-role, root, root]
+          when: "'root' not in ((etcd_root_roles.stdout | from_json).roles | default([], true))"
+          changed_when: true
+
+        - name: 开启认证
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: ["{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcdctl", auth, enable]
+          changed_when: true

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/consumers.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+---
+- name: 收敛消费者账号及独立 prefix
+  hosts: etcd[0]
+  become: true
+  gather_facts: false
+  pre_tasks:
+    - name: 加载共享默认参数
+      ansible.builtin.import_role:
+        name: shared_etcd
+        tasks_from: context
+  environment:
+    ETCDCTL_ENDPOINTS: "https://{{ etcd_address }}:{{ etcd_client_port }}"
+    ETCDCTL_CACERT: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/ca.crt"
+    ETCDCTL_CERT: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/admin.crt"
+    ETCDCTL_KEY: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/admin.key"
+  tasks:
+    - name: 检查认证状态
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: ["{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcdctl", --write-out=json, auth, status]
+      register: etcd_auth_status
+      changed_when: false
+      check_mode: false
+
+    - name: 要求认证已启用
+      ansible.builtin.assert:
+        that:
+          - ((etcd_auth_status.stdout | from_json).enabled | default(false))
+          - etcd_consumers | map(attribute='name') | unique | length == etcd_consumers | length
+          - etcd_bao_token | length > 0
+      no_log: true
+
+    - name: 逐个收敛消费者
+      ansible.builtin.include_tasks: tasks/consumer.yml
+      loop: "{{ etcd_consumers }}"
+      loop_control:
+        loop_var: etcd_consumer
+        label: "{{ etcd_consumer.name }}"

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/controller.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+---
+# 仅在 Terraform 身份配置完成后部署；预检失败不启用定时器。
+- name: 安装独立于人工会话的续签调度
+  hosts: etcd-laptop
+  become: true
+  gather_facts: false
+  tasks:
+    - name: 创建 root 管理的程序目录
+      ansible.builtin.file:
+        path: /opt/homelab-etcd-controller
+        state: directory
+        mode: '0755'
+    - name: 安装证书登录与调度程序
+      ansible.builtin.copy:
+        src: "../controller/{{ item }}"
+        dest: "/opt/homelab-etcd-controller/{{ item }}"
+        owner: root
+        group: root
+        mode: '0755'
+      loop: [login.py, renew.py]
+    - name: 以机器身份预检（不输出 token）
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: [/usr/bin/python3, /opt/homelab-etcd-controller/login.py]
+      changed_when: false
+      no_log: true
+    - name: 安装固定的 Ansible 配置副本
+      ansible.builtin.copy:
+        src: "{{ playbook_dir }}/"
+        dest: /opt/homelab-etcd-controller/ansible/
+        owner: root
+        group: root
+        mode: preserve
+    - name: 创建调度状态目录
+      ansible.builtin.file:
+        path: /var/lib/homelab-etcd-controller
+        state: directory
+        owner: panxiao81
+        group: panxiao81
+        mode: '0700'
+    - name: 安装续签 oneshot unit
+      ansible.builtin.copy:
+        dest: /etc/systemd/system/homelab-etcd-renew.service
+        mode: '0644'
+        content: |
+          [Unit]
+          Description=Renew shared etcd certificates through Bao machine identity
+          After=network-online.target
+          [Service]
+          Type=oneshot
+          User=panxiao81
+          Environment=HOME=/home/panxiao81
+          Environment=PATH=/home/panxiao81/.local/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin
+          ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /opt/homelab-etcd-controller/renew.py
+          TimeoutStartSec=30min
+          UMask=0077
+    - name: 安装每日续签 timer
+      ansible.builtin.copy:
+        dest: /etc/systemd/system/homelab-etcd-renew.timer
+        mode: '0644'
+        content: |
+          [Unit]
+          Description=Daily shared etcd certificate renewal check
+          [Timer]
+          OnCalendar=*-*-* 04:10:00 UTC
+          RandomizedDelaySec=15min
+          Persistent=true
+          [Install]
+          WantedBy=timers.target
+    - name: 启用续签调度
+      ansible.builtin.systemd_service:
+        name: homelab-etcd-renew.timer
+        daemon_reload: true
+        enabled: true
+        state: started

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/inventory/group_vars/all.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+---
+etcd_bao_url: https://bao.ad.ddupan.top:8200
+etcd_bao_pki_mount: pki
+etcd_bao_kv_mount: kv
+etcd_bao_secret_base: infra/etcd/consumers
+# 只在控制端使用，不下发 Bao token。也不读取或复制历史 .vault_pass。
+etcd_bao_token: "{{ lookup('env', 'BAO_TOKEN') }}"
+etcd_consumers:
+  - name: patroni-pg-prod
+    prefix: /homelab/patroni/pg-prod/
+etcd_lxc_template: laptop:vztmpl/ubuntu-24.04-standard_24.04-2_amd64.tar.zst
+etcd_lxc_storage: pve-rg
+etcd_lxc_bridge: labnet
+etcd_lxc_gateway: 10.60.0.1
+etcd_lxc_memory: 512
+etcd_lxc_disk_gb: 8
+etcd_lxc_pubkey: "{{ lookup('file', '~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub') }}"
+
+# 与现有 LAN exporter 相同的内网采集边界；禁止映射到公网。
+etcd_metrics_urls: "http://127.0.0.1:2381,http://{{ etcd_address }}:2381"

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/inventory/hosts.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+---
+# 已部署成员；共置 PG standby/备份的承载预算，数据库数据用独立 HDD mp0。
+all:
+  vars:
+    ansible_user: root
+  children:
+    etcd:
+      hosts:
+        etcd-laptop:
+          ansible_connection: local
+          ansible_host: 192.168.10.127
+          ansible_user: panxiao81
+          etcd_address: 192.168.10.127
+        etcd-pve1:
+          ansible_host: 10.60.0.20
+          etcd_address: 10.60.0.20
+        etcd-pve2:
+          ansible_host: 10.60.0.21
+          etcd_address: 10.60.0.21
+    etcd_pve:
+      hosts:
+        pve1:
+          ansible_host: 192.168.10.4
+          etcd_lxc_vmid: 150
+          etcd_lxc_hostname: etcd-pve1
+          etcd_lxc_address: 10.60.0.20/24
+          etcd_lxc_memory: 1536
+        pve2:
+          ansible_host: 192.168.10.7
+          etcd_lxc_vmid: 151
+          etcd_lxc_hostname: etcd-pve2
+          etcd_lxc_address: 10.60.0.21/24
+          etcd_lxc_memory: 768

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/lxc.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+---
+# 只创建已声明且尚不存在的 LXC；不接管未知 VMID，不重启现有容器。
+- name: 创建独立 etcd LXC
+  hosts: etcd_pve
+  become: true
+  gather_facts: false
+  tasks:
+    - name: 读取全局资源，避免 VMID 在其他节点已占用
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: [pvesh, get, /cluster/resources, --type, vm, --output-format, json]
+      register: etcd_pve_resources
+      changed_when: false
+      check_mode: false
+
+    - name: 保存同号资源
+      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
+        etcd_lxc_existing: >-
+          {{ etcd_pve_resources.stdout
+            | from_json
+            | selectattr('vmid', 'equalto', etcd_lxc_vmid)
+            | list }}
+
+    - name: 拒绝接管未知资源
+      ansible.builtin.assert:
+        that:
+          - >-
+            etcd_lxc_existing | length == 0 or
+            (etcd_lxc_existing[0].type == 'lxc' and etcd_lxc_existing[0].node == inventory_hostname
+             and etcd_lxc_existing[0].name == etcd_lxc_hostname
+             and 'shared-etcd' in (etcd_lxc_existing[0].tags | default('')))
+
+    - name: 新建无特权 LXC
+      when: etcd_lxc_existing | length == 0 and not ansible_check_mode
+      block:
+        - name: 暂存 SSH 公钥
+          ansible.builtin.copy:
+            content: "{{ etcd_lxc_pubkey }}\n"
+            dest: /run/shared-etcd-bootstrap.pub
+            mode: '0600'
+        - name: 创建声明的容器
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv:
+              - pct
+              - create
+              - "{{ etcd_lxc_vmid }}"
+              - "{{ etcd_lxc_template }}"
+              - --hostname
+              - "{{ etcd_lxc_hostname }}"
+              - --unprivileged
+              - '1'
+              - --cores
+              - '1'
+              - --memory
+              - "{{ etcd_lxc_memory }}"
+              - --swap
+              - '0'
+              - --rootfs
+              - "{{ etcd_lxc_storage }}:{{ etcd_lxc_disk_gb }}"
+              - --net0
+              - "name=eth0,bridge={{ etcd_lxc_bridge }},ip={{ etcd_lxc_address }},gw={{ etcd_lxc_gateway }},type=veth"
+              - --nameserver
+              - 192.168.10.5
+              - --searchdomain
+              - ad.ddupan.top
+              - --ssh-public-keys
+              - /run/shared-etcd-bootstrap.pub
+              - --onboot
+              - '1'
+              - --tags
+              - ansible;shared-etcd
+          changed_when: true
+      always:
+        - name: 删除暂存公钥
+          ansible.builtin.file:
+            path: /run/shared-etcd-bootstrap.pub
+            state: absent
+
+    - name: 读取容器配置
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: [pct, config, "{{ etcd_lxc_vmid }}"]
+      changed_when: false
+      register: etcd_lxc_config
+      when: not ansible_check_mode or etcd_lxc_existing | length > 0
+
+    - name: 配置漂移先报错，不直接改运行中的网络/资源
+      ansible.builtin.assert:
+        that:
+          - >-
+            ('ip=' ~ etcd_lxc_address ~ ',') in etcd_lxc_config.stdout or
+            ('ip=' ~ etcd_lxc_address ~ '\n') in etcd_lxc_config.stdout
+          - "('bridge=' ~ etcd_lxc_bridge ~ ',') in etcd_lxc_config.stdout"
+          - "'unprivileged: 1' in etcd_lxc_config.stdout"
+          - "('memory: ' ~ etcd_lxc_memory) in etcd_lxc_config.stdout"
+          - "('rootfs: ' ~ etcd_lxc_storage ~ ':') in etcd_lxc_config.stdout"
+      when: etcd_lxc_config is not skipped
+
+    - name: 读取容器运行状态
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: [pct, status, "{{ etcd_lxc_vmid }}"]
+      changed_when: false
+      register: etcd_lxc_status
+      when: not ansible_check_mode
+
+    - name: 启动容器
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: [pct, start, "{{ etcd_lxc_vmid }}"]
+      changed_when: true
+      when: not ansible_check_mode and 'running' not in etcd_lxc_status.stdout
+
+    - name: 通过可信宿主机取得容器 SSH 公钥
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: [pct, exec, "{{ etcd_lxc_vmid }}", --, cat, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub]
+      register: etcd_lxc_hostkey
+      changed_when: false
+      retries: 12
+      delay: 5
+      until: etcd_lxc_hostkey.rc == 0
+      when: not ansible_check_mode
+
+    - name: 保存经宿主机验证的 SSH host key
+      ansible.builtin.known_hosts:
+        name: "{{ etcd_lxc_address.split('/')[0] }}"
+        key: "{{ etcd_lxc_address.split('/')[0] }} {{ etcd_lxc_hostkey.stdout }}"
+      delegate_to: localhost
+      become: false
+      when: not ansible_check_mode

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/move-storage.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+---
+# 首次部署承载调整，逐节点迁移；普通 lxc.yml 不自动移动磁盘。
+- name: 逐个将新 etcd 容器迁入声明的 SSD 池
+  hosts: etcd_pve
+  become: true
+  gather_facts: false
+  serial: 1
+  any_errors_fatal: true
+  vars:
+    etcd_move_health_command:
+      - /opt/homelab-etcd/etcdctl
+      - --endpoints=https://192.168.10.127:2379,https://10.60.0.20:2379,https://10.60.0.21:2379
+      - --cacert=/etc/homelab-etcd/ca.crt
+      - --cert=/etc/homelab-etcd/admin.crt
+      - --key=/etc/homelab-etcd/admin.key
+      - endpoint
+      - health
+  tasks:
+    - name: 核对容器配置
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: [pct, config, "{{ etcd_lxc_vmid }}"]
+      register: etcd_move_config
+      changed_when: false
+      check_mode: false
+
+    - name: 限定本项目新建容器与允许的源池
+      ansible.builtin.assert:
+        that:
+          - etcd_lxc_vmid in [150, 151]
+          - "('hostname: ' ~ etcd_lxc_hostname) in etcd_move_config.stdout"
+          - "'shared-etcd' in etcd_move_config.stdout"
+          - "'rootfs: local-lvm:' in etcd_move_config.stdout or 'rootfs: pve-rg:' in etcd_move_config.stdout"
+          - etcd_lxc_storage == 'pve-rg'
+
+    - name: 验证迁移前全部端点健康
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: "{{ etcd_move_health_command }}"
+      delegate_to: localhost
+      changed_when: false
+      check_mode: false
+
+    - name: 迁移当前尚在本地池的根卷
+      when: "'rootfs: local-lvm:' in etcd_move_config.stdout and not ansible_check_mode"
+      block:
+        - name: 创建已验证的集群快照
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: [systemctl, start, homelab-etcd-snapshot.service]
+          delegate_to: localhost
+          changed_when: true
+
+        - name: 正常关闭一个容器
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: [pct, shutdown, "{{ etcd_lxc_vmid }}", --timeout, '60']
+          changed_when: true
+
+        - name: 复制成功后移除该新建容器的原卷
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv:
+              - pct
+              - move-volume
+              - "{{ etcd_lxc_vmid }}"
+              - rootfs
+              - "{{ etcd_lxc_storage }}"
+              - --delete
+              - '1'
+              - --bwlimit
+              - '32768'
+          changed_when: true
+      always:
+        - name: 核对容器运行状态
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: [pct, status, "{{ etcd_lxc_vmid }}"]
+          register: etcd_move_status
+          changed_when: false
+        - name: 重新启动容器
+          ansible.builtin.command:
+            argv: [pct, start, "{{ etcd_lxc_vmid }}"]
+          when: "'running' not in etcd_move_status.stdout"
+          changed_when: true
+
+    - name: 等待当前成员回归
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv: "{{ etcd_move_health_command }}"
+      delegate_to: localhost
+      changed_when: false
+      register: etcd_move_health
+      retries: 18
+      delay: 5
+      until: etcd_move_health.rc == 0
+      when: not ansible_check_mode

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/requirements.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+---
+collections:
+  - name: community.crypto
+    version: 3.2.1

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/roles/shared_etcd/defaults/main.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+etcd_version: 3.7.2
+etcd_archive_checksum: sha256:3a3679bc51a4ee9d30bccea1da7cd4fe62c6fc1d2ca1255068d2c53bf3026135
+etcd_install_dir: /opt/homelab-etcd
+etcd_config_dir: /etc/homelab-etcd
+etcd_data_dir: /var/lib/homelab-etcd
+etcd_cluster_token: homelab-shared-etcd-v1
+etcd_client_port: 2379
+etcd_peer_port: 2380
+etcd_metrics_port: 2381
+etcd_quota_bytes: 268435456
+etcd_memory_high: 256M
+etcd_memory_max: 384M
+etcd_certificate_ttl: 1440h
+etcd_renew_before: +14d
+etcd_snapshot_dir: /var/backups/homelab-etcd
+etcd_snapshot_keep: 3

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/roles/shared_etcd/tasks/certificate.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+---
+- name: 在成员本地生成私钥
+  community.crypto.openssl_privatekey:
+    path: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/{{ etcd_cert.name }}.key"
+    type: ECC
+    curve: secp256r1
+    owner: root
+    group: "{{ etcd_cert.group }}"
+    mode: '0640'
+
+- name: 本地生成 CSR
+  community.crypto.openssl_csr:
+    path: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/{{ etcd_cert.name }}.csr"
+    privatekey_path: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/{{ etcd_cert.name }}.key"
+    common_name: "{{ etcd_cert.cn | default(omit, true) }}"
+    subject_alt_name: >-
+      {{ ['IP:' ~ etcd_address, 'DNS:' ~ inventory_hostname] if etcd_cert.name in ['server', 'peer']
+         else (['DNS:' ~ inventory_hostname] if etcd_cert.name == 'gateway' else []) }}
+    use_common_name_for_san: false
+    extended_key_usage: "{{ etcd_cert.eku }}"
+    key_usage: [digitalSignature]
+    mode: '0644'
+  register: etcd_csr_state
+
+- name: 检查已有证书
+  ansible.builtin.stat:
+    path: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/{{ etcd_cert.name }}.crt"
+  register: etcd_cert_file
+
+- name: 检查续签窗口
+  community.crypto.x509_certificate_info:
+    path: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/{{ etcd_cert.name }}.crt"
+    valid_at:
+      renewal: "{{ etcd_renew_before }}"
+  register: etcd_cert_info
+  when: etcd_cert_file.stat.exists
+
+- name: 通过中央 CA 签发需更新的证书
+  when: >-
+    not etcd_cert_file.stat.exists or etcd_csr_state is changed or
+    not (etcd_cert_info.valid_at.renewal | default(false))
+  block:
+    - name: 仅在确需签发时要求 Bao 凭据
+      ansible.builtin.assert:
+        that: etcd_bao_token | length > 0
+      no_log: true
+
+    - name: 读取 CSR 公共内容
+      ansible.builtin.slurp:
+        src: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/{{ etcd_cert.name }}.csr"
+      register: etcd_csr
+
+    - name: 控制端提交 Bao 签名请求
+      ansible.builtin.uri:
+        url: "{{ etcd_bao_url }}/v1/{{ etcd_bao_pki_mount }}/sign/{{ etcd_cert.role }}"
+        method: POST
+        headers:
+          X-Vault-Token: "{{ etcd_bao_token }}"
+        body_format: json
+        body:
+          csr: "{{ etcd_csr.content | b64decode }}"
+          ttl: "{{ etcd_certificate_ttl }}"
+        status_code: 200
+      delegate_to: localhost
+      become: false
+      register: etcd_signed
+      no_log: true
+      when: not ansible_check_mode
+
+    - name: 保存签发的证书链
+      ansible.builtin.copy:
+        content: |
+          {{ etcd_signed.json.data.certificate }}
+          {{ etcd_signed.json.data.ca_chain | join('\n') }}
+        dest: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/{{ etcd_cert.name }}.crt"
+        owner: root
+        group: "{{ etcd_cert.group }}"
+        mode: '0644'
+      when: not ansible_check_mode
+
+    - name: 保存中央 CA 信任链
+      ansible.builtin.copy:
+        content: |
+          {{ etcd_signed.json.data.ca_chain | join('\n') }}
+        dest: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/ca.crt"
+        owner: root
+        group: homelab-etcd
+        mode: '0644'
+      when: not ansible_check_mode
+
+    - name: 标记证书已更新
+      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
+        etcd_certificates_changed: true

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/roles/shared_etcd/tasks/context.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+---
+# 只加载 role defaults，供运维入口复用。
+[]

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/roles/shared_etcd/tasks/main.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+---
+- name: 验证拓扑和签发配置
+  ansible.builtin.assert:
+    that:
+      - groups['etcd'] | length == 3
+      - groups['etcd'] | map('extract', hostvars, 'etcd_address') | unique | length == 3
+      - ansible_facts['architecture'] == 'x86_64'
+      - etcd_bao_url is match('^https://')
+      - etcd_archive_checksum is match('^sha256:[a-f0-9]{64}$')
+  no_log: true
+
+- name: 安装证书处理依赖
+  ansible.builtin.package:
+    name: [python3-cryptography, openssl]
+    state: present
+
+- name: 创建独立 etcd 组
+  ansible.builtin.group:
+    name: homelab-etcd
+    system: true
+
+- name: 创建独立 etcd 用户
+  ansible.builtin.user:
+    name: homelab-etcd
+    group: homelab-etcd
+    system: true
+    shell: /usr/sbin/nologin
+    create_home: false
+
+- name: 创建受管目录
+  ansible.builtin.file:
+    path: "{{ item.path }}"
+    state: directory
+    owner: "{{ item.owner }}"
+    group: homelab-etcd
+    mode: "{{ item.mode }}"
+  loop:
+    - {path: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}", owner: root, mode: '0750'}
+    - {path: "{{ etcd_data_dir }}", owner: homelab-etcd, mode: '0700'}
+    - {path: "{{ etcd_install_dir }}", owner: root, mode: '0755'}
+
+- name: 下载固定版本及校验归档
+  ansible.builtin.get_url:
+    url: >-
+      https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/releases/download/v{{ etcd_version }}/etcd-v{{ etcd_version }}-linux-amd64.tar.gz
+    dest: "{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcd-v{{ etcd_version }}.tar.gz"
+    checksum: "{{ etcd_archive_checksum }}"
+    mode: '0644'
+  register: etcd_download
+  retries: 3
+  delay: 5
+  until: etcd_download is succeeded
+
+- name: 展开固定版本
+  ansible.builtin.unarchive:
+    src: "{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcd-v{{ etcd_version }}.tar.gz"
+    dest: "{{ etcd_install_dir }}"
+    remote_src: true
+    creates: "{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcd-v{{ etcd_version }}-linux-amd64/etcd"
+
+- name: 安装版本链接
+  ansible.builtin.file:
+    src: "{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcd-v{{ etcd_version }}-linux-amd64/{{ item }}"
+    dest: "{{ etcd_install_dir }}/{{ item }}"
+    state: link
+  loop: [etcd, etcdctl, etcdutl]
+  register: etcd_binary_links
+
+- name: 签发成员与管理员证书
+  ansible.builtin.include_tasks: certificate.yml
+  loop:
+    - {name: server, role: homelab-etcd-server, cn: "{{ inventory_hostname }}", eku: [serverAuth], group: homelab-etcd}
+    - {name: peer, role: homelab-etcd-peer, cn: homelab-etcd-peer, eku: [serverAuth, clientAuth], group: homelab-etcd}
+    - {name: gateway, role: homelab-etcd-gateway, cn: "", eku: [clientAuth], group: homelab-etcd}
+    - {name: admin, role: homelab-etcd-admin, cn: root, eku: [clientAuth], group: root}
+  loop_control:
+    loop_var: etcd_cert
+
+- name: 写入独立 etcd 配置
+  ansible.builtin.template:
+    src: etcd.yml.j2
+    dest: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/etcd.yml"
+    owner: root
+    group: homelab-etcd
+    mode: '0640'
+  register: etcd_config_file
+
+- name: 写入独立 systemd unit
+  ansible.builtin.template:
+    src: homelab-etcd.service.j2
+    dest: /etc/systemd/system/homelab-etcd.service
+    mode: '0644'
+  register: etcd_unit
+
+# 跨失败重跑记录激活状态，防止上一轮写文件后中断导致漏掉必要重启。
+- name: 计算受管文件校验和
+  ansible.builtin.stat:
+    path: "{{ item }}"
+    checksum_algorithm: sha256
+  loop:
+    - "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/etcd.yml"
+    - "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/server.crt"
+    - "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/peer.crt"
+    - "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/gateway.crt"
+    - "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/ca.crt"
+    - /etc/systemd/system/homelab-etcd.service
+  register: etcd_managed_files
+
+- name: 计算期望激活指纹
+  ansible.builtin.set_fact:
+    etcd_config_fingerprint: >-
+      {{ ((etcd_managed_files.results | map(attribute='stat.checksum') | list | join(':'))
+          ~ ':' ~ etcd_version) | hash('sha256') }}
+  when: not ansible_check_mode
+
+- name: 检查已激活指纹
+  ansible.builtin.stat:
+    path: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/activated.sha256"
+  register: etcd_activated_file
+
+- name: 读取已激活指纹
+  ansible.builtin.slurp:
+    src: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/activated.sha256"
+  register: etcd_activated
+  when: etcd_activated_file.stat.exists
+
+- name: 判断是否需要滚动激活
+  ansible.builtin.set_fact:
+    etcd_config_changed: >-
+      {{ not etcd_activated_file.stat.exists or
+         (etcd_activated.content | default('') | b64decode | trim) != etcd_config_fingerprint | default('check-mode') }}
+
+- name: 管理本地快照任务
+  ansible.builtin.import_tasks: snapshot.yml

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/roles/shared_etcd/tasks/snapshot.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+---
+- name: 创建仅 root 可访问的快照目录
+  ansible.builtin.file:
+    path: "{{ etcd_snapshot_dir }}"
+    state: directory
+    owner: root
+    group: root
+    mode: '0700'
+
+- name: 写入快照脚本和 systemd 任务
+  ansible.builtin.template:
+    src: "{{ item.src }}"
+    dest: "{{ item.dest }}"
+    mode: "{{ item.mode }}"
+  loop:
+    - {src: snapshot.sh.j2, dest: "{{ etcd_install_dir }}/snapshot", mode: '0700'}
+    - {src: snapshot.service.j2, dest: /etc/systemd/system/homelab-etcd-snapshot.service, mode: '0644'}
+    - {src: snapshot.timer.j2, dest: /etc/systemd/system/homelab-etcd-snapshot.timer, mode: '0644'}
+  register: etcd_snapshot_units
+
+- name: 启用本地快照计划
+  ansible.builtin.systemd_service:
+    name: homelab-etcd-snapshot.timer
+    daemon_reload: "{{ etcd_snapshot_units is changed }}"
+    enabled: true
+    state: started

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/roles/shared_etcd/templates/etcd.yml.j2

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# Ansible 管理；与 k3s、数据库生命周期独立。
+name: {{ inventory_hostname | to_json }}
+data-dir: {{ etcd_data_dir | to_json }}
+listen-client-urls: https://{{ etcd_address }}:{{ etcd_client_port }}
+advertise-client-urls: https://{{ etcd_address }}:{{ etcd_client_port }}
+listen-peer-urls: https://{{ etcd_address }}:{{ etcd_peer_port }}
+initial-advertise-peer-urls: https://{{ etcd_address }}:{{ etcd_peer_port }}
+initial-cluster: "{% for member in groups['etcd'] %}{{ member }}=https://{{ hostvars[member].etcd_address }}:{{ etcd_peer_port }}{{ ',' if not loop.last else '' }}{% endfor %}"
+initial-cluster-token: {{ etcd_cluster_token | to_json }}
+initial-cluster-state: new
+# 已存在的数据目录优先；成员替换必须走单独 runbook，不删除数据重建。
+client-transport-security:
+  cert-file: {{ etcd_config_dir }}/server.crt
+  key-file: {{ etcd_config_dir }}/server.key
+  client-cert-file: {{ etcd_config_dir }}/gateway.crt
+  client-key-file: {{ etcd_config_dir }}/gateway.key
+  trusted-ca-file: {{ etcd_config_dir }}/ca.crt
+  client-cert-auth: true
+peer-transport-security:
+  cert-file: {{ etcd_config_dir }}/peer.crt
+  key-file: {{ etcd_config_dir }}/peer.key
+  trusted-ca-file: {{ etcd_config_dir }}/ca.crt
+  client-cert-auth: true
+  allowed-cn: [homelab-etcd-peer]
+# 独立 metrics listener 仅提供指标/健康，不开放 KV API；只绑定受管内网地址。
+listen-metrics-urls: {{ etcd_metrics_urls | default("http://127.0.0.1:" ~ etcd_metrics_port) | to_json }}
+quota-backend-bytes: {{ etcd_quota_bytes }}
+auto-compaction-mode: periodic
+auto-compaction-retention: '1h'
+heartbeat-interval: 100
+election-timeout: 1000
+logger: zap
+log-level: info

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/roles/shared_etcd/templates/homelab-etcd.service.j2

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Homelab shared etcd
+Wants=network-online.target
+After=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+User=homelab-etcd
+Group=homelab-etcd
+ExecStart={{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcd --config-file={{ etcd_config_dir }}/etcd.yml
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=5
+TimeoutStopSec=60
+MemoryHigh={{ etcd_memory_high }}
+MemoryMax={{ etcd_memory_max }}
+UMask=0077
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ReadWritePaths={{ etcd_data_dir }}
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/roles/shared_etcd/templates/snapshot.service.j2

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Snapshot homelab shared etcd
+After=homelab-etcd.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+ExecStart={{ etcd_install_dir }}/snapshot
+User=root
+UMask=0077
+TimeoutStartSec=300
+Nice=10

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/roles/shared_etcd/templates/snapshot.sh.j2

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+set -euo pipefail
+umask 077
+export ETCDCTL_ENDPOINTS="https://{{ etcd_address }}:{{ etcd_client_port }}"
+export ETCDCTL_CACERT="{{ etcd_config_dir }}/ca.crt"
+export ETCDCTL_CERT="{{ etcd_config_dir }}/admin.crt"
+export ETCDCTL_KEY="{{ etcd_config_dir }}/admin.key"
+repo="{{ etcd_snapshot_dir }}"
+exec 9>"$repo/.lock"
+flock -n 9 || exit 0
+output="$repo/$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ).db"
+trap 'rm -f "$output.partial" "$output.partial.part"' EXIT
+{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcdctl snapshot save "$output.partial"
+{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcdutl snapshot status "$output.partial" >/dev/null
+mv "$output.partial" "$output"
+# 只有新快照成功且验证可读才清理旧备份。目录仅由此任务管理。
+mapfile -t snapshots < <(find "$repo" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name '????????T??????Z.db' -printf '%f\n' | sort -r)
+for old in "${snapshots[@]:{{ etcd_snapshot_keep }}}"; do
+    rm -- "$repo/$old"
+done

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/roles/shared_etcd/templates/snapshot.timer.j2

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Daily homelab etcd snapshot
+
+[Timer]
+OnCalendar=*-*-* 03:20:00 UTC
+RandomizedDelaySec=300
+Persistent=true
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=timers.target

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/site.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+---
+# 先配置全体，再滚动启动：首次集群形成不能在第一个节点等待 quorum。
+- name: 配置 shared etcd 成员
+  hosts: etcd
+  become: true
+  roles:
+    - shared_etcd
+
+- name: 滚动启动并验证 shared etcd
+  hosts: etcd
+  become: true
+  serial: 1
+  pre_tasks:
+    - name: 加载共享默认参数
+      ansible.builtin.import_role:
+        name: shared_etcd
+        tasks_from: context
+  tasks:
+    - name: 启动已配置的成员
+      ansible.builtin.systemd_service:
+        name: homelab-etcd
+        enabled: true
+        daemon_reload: true
+        state: "{{ 'restarted' if etcd_config_changed | bool else 'started' }}"
+    - name: 等待本机客户端端口
+      ansible.builtin.wait_for:
+        host: "{{ etcd_address }}"
+        port: "{{ etcd_client_port }}"
+        timeout: 60
+      when: not ansible_check_mode
+
+    - name: 已有集群每次激活后等待本成员恢复 quorum 通信
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv:
+          - "{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcdctl"
+          - --endpoints=https://{{ etcd_address }}:{{ etcd_client_port }}
+          - --cacert={{ etcd_config_dir }}/ca.crt
+          - --cert={{ etcd_config_dir }}/admin.crt
+          - --key={{ etcd_config_dir }}/admin.key
+          - endpoint
+          - health
+      changed_when: false
+      register: etcd_member_health
+      retries: 12
+      delay: 5
+      until: etcd_member_health.rc == 0
+      when: etcd_activated_file.stat.exists and not ansible_check_mode
+
+- name: 核对全部成员
+  ansible.builtin.import_playbook: verify.yml
+
+- name: 记录已成功激活的配置
+  hosts: etcd
+  become: true
+  pre_tasks:
+    - name: 加载共享默认参数
+      ansible.builtin.import_role:
+        name: shared_etcd
+        tasks_from: context
+  tasks:
+    - name: 写入激活指纹（全体健康检查通过后）
+      ansible.builtin.copy:
+        content: "{{ etcd_config_fingerprint }}\n"
+        dest: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/activated.sha256"
+        mode: '0644'
+      when: not ansible_check_mode

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/tasks/consumer.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+---
+- name: 验证消费者范围
+  ansible.builtin.assert:
+    that:
+      - etcd_consumer.name is match('^[a-z][a-z0-9-]+$')
+      - etcd_consumer.name != 'root'
+      - etcd_consumer.prefix is match('^/homelab/[a-zA-Z0-9/_-]+/$')
+      - etcd_consumer.prefix | length > 10
+
+- name: 读取已有用户和角色
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv: ["{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcdctl", --write-out=json, "{{ item }}", list]
+  loop: [user, role]
+  register: etcd_identities
+  changed_when: false
+  check_mode: false
+
+# 404 data 也可能代表被删除/销毁的旧秘密；只有 metadata 不存在才允许生成。
+- name: 控制端读取 Bao 秘密元数据
+  ansible.builtin.uri:
+    url: "{{ etcd_bao_url }}/v1/{{ etcd_bao_kv_mount }}/metadata/{{ etcd_bao_secret_base }}/{{ etcd_consumer.name }}"
+    headers:
+      X-Vault-Token: "{{ etcd_bao_token }}"
+    status_code: [200, 404]
+  delegate_to: localhost
+  become: false
+  no_log: true
+  register: etcd_secret_metadata
+  check_mode: false
+
+- name: 禁止已有用户丢失秘密后自动换密码
+  ansible.builtin.assert:
+    that: >-
+      etcd_secret_metadata.status == 200 or
+      etcd_consumer.name not in ((etcd_identities.results[0].stdout | from_json).users | default([], true))
+    fail_msg: etcd 用户已存在但 Bao 秘密缺失；需恢复原秘密或执行显式轮换。
+
+- name: 首次创建随机秘密且禁止覆盖已有版本
+  ansible.builtin.uri:
+    url: "{{ etcd_bao_url }}/v1/{{ etcd_bao_kv_mount }}/data/{{ etcd_bao_secret_base }}/{{ etcd_consumer.name }}"
+    method: POST
+    headers:
+      X-Vault-Token: "{{ etcd_bao_token }}"
+    body_format: json
+    body:
+      options: {cas: 0}
+      data:
+        username: "{{ etcd_consumer.name }}"
+        password: "{{ lookup('ansible.builtin.password', '/dev/null', length=48, chars=['ascii_letters', 'digits']) }}"
+        prefix: "{{ etcd_consumer.prefix }}"
+    status_code: 200
+  delegate_to: localhost
+  become: false
+  no_log: true
+  changed_when: true
+  when:
+    - etcd_secret_metadata.status == 404
+    - not ansible_check_mode
+
+- name: 控制端读取既有秘密
+  ansible.builtin.uri:
+    url: "{{ etcd_bao_url }}/v1/{{ etcd_bao_kv_mount }}/data/{{ etcd_bao_secret_base }}/{{ etcd_consumer.name }}"
+    headers:
+      X-Vault-Token: "{{ etcd_bao_token }}"
+    status_code: 200
+  delegate_to: localhost
+  become: false
+  register: etcd_consumer_secret
+  no_log: true
+  when: etcd_secret_metadata.status == 200 or not ansible_check_mode
+  check_mode: false
+
+- name: 核对已保存秘密归属
+  ansible.builtin.assert:
+    that:
+      - etcd_consumer_secret.json.data.data.username == etcd_consumer.name
+      - etcd_consumer_secret.json.data.data.prefix == etcd_consumer.prefix
+      - etcd_consumer_secret.json.data.data.password | length >= 32
+  no_log: true
+  when: etcd_secret_metadata.status == 200 or not ansible_check_mode
+
+- name: 新建消费者用户（密码只通过 stdin 传递）
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv: ["{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcdctl", user, add, "{{ etcd_consumer.name }}", --interactive=false]
+    stdin: "{{ etcd_consumer_secret.json.data.data.password }}"
+  no_log: true
+  changed_when: true
+  when:
+    - etcd_consumer.name not in ((etcd_identities.results[0].stdout | from_json).users | default([], true))
+    - not ansible_check_mode
+
+- name: 新建消费者角色
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv: ["{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcdctl", role, add, "{{ etcd_consumer.name }}"]
+  changed_when: true
+  when: etcd_consumer.name not in ((etcd_identities.results[1].stdout | from_json).roles | default([], true))
+
+- name: 读取角色权限
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv: ["{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcdctl", --write-out=json, role, get, "{{ etcd_consumer.name }}"]
+  register: etcd_role_state
+  changed_when: false
+  when: >-
+    not ansible_check_mode or
+    etcd_consumer.name in ((etcd_identities.results[1].stdout | from_json).roles | default([], true))
+
+- name: 拒绝不符合声明的既有权限（不自动扩大或删除）
+  ansible.builtin.assert:
+    that:
+      - >-
+        ((etcd_role_state.stdout | from_json).perm | default([], true)) in
+        [[], [{'permType': 2, 'key': etcd_consumer.prefix | b64encode,
+                'range_end': (etcd_consumer.prefix[:-1] ~ '0') | b64encode}]]
+    fail_msg: 既有角色权限与声明不同，请显式审查权限迁移。
+  when: etcd_role_state is not skipped
+
+- name: 授予唯一 prefix 读写权限
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv:
+      - "{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcdctl"
+      - role
+      - grant-permission
+      - "{{ etcd_consumer.name }}"
+      - readwrite
+      - "{{ etcd_consumer.prefix }}"
+      - --prefix=true
+  changed_when: true
+  when:
+    - etcd_role_state is not skipped
+    - ((etcd_role_state.stdout | from_json).perm | default([], true)) | length == 0
+
+- name: 读取用户角色
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv: ["{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcdctl", --write-out=json, user, get, "{{ etcd_consumer.name }}"]
+  register: etcd_user_state
+  changed_when: false
+  when: >-
+    not ansible_check_mode or
+    etcd_consumer.name in ((etcd_identities.results[0].stdout | from_json).users | default([], true))
+
+- name: 拒绝消费者已有额外角色
+  ansible.builtin.assert:
+    that: >-
+      ((etcd_user_state.stdout | from_json).roles | default([], true))
+      | difference([etcd_consumer.name]) | length == 0
+  when: etcd_user_state is not skipped
+
+- name: 绑定消费者角色
+  ansible.builtin.command:
+    argv: ["{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcdctl", user, grant-role, "{{ etcd_consumer.name }}", "{{ etcd_consumer.name }}"]
+  changed_when: true
+  when:
+    - etcd_user_state is not skipped
+    - etcd_consumer.name not in ((etcd_user_state.stdout | from_json).roles | default([], true))
+
+# 使用 gateway 的真实密码登录来核对 Bao 与 etcd 一致性，不能只看用户已存在。
+- name: 验证消费者密码可经 gateway 登录
+  ansible.builtin.uri:
+    url: "https://{{ etcd_address }}:{{ etcd_client_port }}/v3/auth/authenticate"
+    method: POST
+    client_cert: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/gateway.crt"
+    client_key: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/gateway.key"
+    ca_path: "{{ etcd_config_dir }}/ca.crt"
+    body_format: json
+    body:
+      name: "{{ etcd_consumer.name }}"
+      password: "{{ etcd_consumer_secret.json.data.data.password }}"
+    status_code: 200
+  no_log: true
+  when: not ansible_check_mode

infrastructure/etcd/ansible/verify.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+---
+- name: 验证 shared etcd 全部端点
+  hosts: etcd[0]
+  become: true
+  gather_facts: false
+  pre_tasks:
+    - name: 加载共享默认参数
+      ansible.builtin.import_role:
+        name: shared_etcd
+        tasks_from: context
+  tasks:
+    - name: 通过管理员 mTLS 检查所有端点健康
+      ansible.builtin.command:
+        argv:
+          - "{{ etcd_install_dir }}/etcdctl"
+          - >-
+            --endpoints={{ groups['etcd'] | map('extract', hostvars, 'etcd_address')
+            | map('regex_replace', '^(.*)$', 'https://\1:' ~ etcd_client_port) | join(',') }}
+          - --cacert={{ etcd_config_dir }}/ca.crt
+          - --cert={{ etcd_config_dir }}/admin.crt
+          - --key={{ etcd_config_dir }}/admin.key
+          - endpoint
+          - health
+      changed_when: false
+      register: etcd_health
+      retries: 12
+      delay: 5
+      until: etcd_health.rc == 0
+      when: not ansible_check_mode

infrastructure/etcd/controller/login.py

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#!/usr/bin/python3
+"""仅由受控调用者捕获 stdout；不得手动运行以免在终端输出短期 token。"""
+import json
+import ssl
+import sys
+import urllib.request
+
+
+def main():
+    context = ssl.create_default_context()
+    context.load_cert_chain('/etc/homelab-etcd/peer.crt', '/etc/homelab-etcd/peer.key')
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        'https://bao.ad.ddupan.top:8200/v1/auth/homelab-etcd-renewal/login',
+        data=json.dumps({'name': 'etcd-laptop'}).encode(),
+        headers={'Content-Type': 'application/json'}, method='POST',
+    )
+    with urllib.request.urlopen(request, context=context, timeout=30) as response:
+        token = json.load(response)['auth']['client_token']
+    if not isinstance(token, str) or not token:
+        raise ValueError('empty token')
+    sys.stdout.write(token)
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    try:
+        main()
+    except Exception:
+        # Bao 响应和异常对象可能带敏感内容，不写入 journal。
+        sys.stderr.write('Bao certificate login failed\n')
+        sys.exit(1)

infrastructure/etcd/controller/renew.py

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+#!/usr/bin/python3
+"""每日一次，机器证书换短期 token；使用现有串行 Ansible 收敛，不常驻 agent。"""
+import fcntl
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import urllib.request
+
+ROOT = Path('/opt/homelab-etcd-controller')
+
+
+def main():
+    with open('/var/lib/homelab-etcd-controller/renew.lock', 'a') as lock:
+        try:
+            fcntl.flock(lock, fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB)
+        except BlockingIOError:
+            return 0
+        login = subprocess.run(
+            ['sudo', '-n', '/usr/bin/python3', str(ROOT / 'login.py')],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=40,
+        )
+        if login.returncode or not login.stdout.strip():
+            print('Bao 机器证书登录失败；保留现有证书与运行中的 etcd。', file=sys.stderr)
+            return 1
+        token = login.stdout.strip()
+        env = dict(os.environ, BAO_TOKEN=token)
+        try:
+            for play in ['verify.yml', 'site.yml']:
+                result = subprocess.run(
+                    ['/home/panxiao81/.local/bin/ansible-playbook', play],
+                    cwd=ROOT / 'ansible', env=env, timeout=750,
+                )
+                if result.returncode:
+                    return result.returncode
+            Path('/var/lib/homelab-etcd-controller/last-success').touch()
+            return 0
+        finally:
+            request = urllib.request.Request(
+                'https://bao.ad.ddupan.top:8200/v1/auth/token/revoke-self',
+                data=b'{}', headers={'X-Vault-Token': token}, method='POST',
+            )
+            try:
+                with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15):
+                    pass
+            except Exception:
+                print('短期 token 撤销未确认，将由 TTL 自动失效。', file=sys.stderr)
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    raise SystemExit(main())

infrastructure/etcd/run.py

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""从当前 Bao 登录会话向子进程传递凭据，不写临时秘密文件或输出秘密。"""
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import subprocess
+import sys
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+
+
+def main():
+    if len(sys.argv) < 3 or sys.argv[1] not in ('terraform', 'ansible'):
+        raise SystemExit('用法：python3 run.py terraform <args> | ansible <playbook> [args]')
+    env = dict(os.environ)
+    env.setdefault('BAO_ADDR', 'https://bao.ad.ddupan.top:8200')
+    token = env.get('BAO_TOKEN') or env.get('VAULT_TOKEN')
+    if not token:
+        token = Path('~/.vault-token').expanduser().read_text().strip()
+    env['BAO_TOKEN'] = env['VAULT_TOKEN'] = token
+    if sys.argv[1] == 'terraform':
+        response = subprocess.run(
+            ['bao', 'kv', 'get', '-format=json', 'kv/k8s/seaweedfs-s3'],
+            env=env, capture_output=True, text=True,
+        )
+        if response.returncode:
+            raise SystemExit('读取 tfstate 受限身份失败；请检查 Bao 登录和授权。')
+        config = json.loads(response.stdout)['data']['data']['seaweedfs_s3_config']
+        config = json.loads(config) if isinstance(config, str) else config
+        identities = [i for i in config['identities'] if i['name'] == 'terraform']
+        if len(identities) != 1 or len(identities[0]['credentials']) != 1:
+            raise SystemExit('tfstate 身份不唯一，拒绝猜测凭据。')
+        credential = identities[0]['credentials'][0]
+        env['AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID'] = credential['accessKey']
+        env['AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY'] = credential['secretKey']
+        command, cwd = ['terraform', *sys.argv[2:]], ROOT / 'terraform'
+    else:
+        command, cwd = ['ansible-playbook', *sys.argv[2:]], ROOT / 'ansible'
+    raise SystemExit(subprocess.run(command, cwd=cwd, env=env).returncode)
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    main()

infrastructure/etcd/terraform/.terraform.lock.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# This file is maintained automatically by "terraform init".
+# Manual edits may be lost in future updates.
+
+provider "registry.terraform.io/hashicorp/vault" {
+  version     = "4.8.0"
+  constraints = "~> 4.0"
+  hashes = [
+    "h1:aHqgWQhDBMeZO9iUKwJYMlh4q+xNMUlMIcjRbF4d02Y=",
+    "zh:269ab13433f67684012ae7e15876532b0312f5d0d2002a9cf9febb1279ce5ea6",
+    "zh:4babc95bf0c40eb85005db1dc2ca403c46be4a71dd3e409db3711a56f7a5ca0e",
+    "zh:78d5eefdd9e494defcb3c68d282b8f96630502cac21d1ea161f53cfe9bb483b3",
+    "zh:86e27c1c625ecc24446a11eeffc3ac319b36c2b4e51251db8579256a0dbcf136",
+    "zh:a32f31da94824009e26b077374440b52098aecb93c92ff55dc3d31dd37c4ea25",
+    "zh:be0a18c6c0425518bab4fbffd82078b82036a88503b5d76064de551c9f646cbf",
+    "zh:be5a77fdfd36863ebeec79cd12b1d13322ffad6821d157a0b279789fa06b5937",
+    "zh:be8317d142a3caad74c7d936039ae27076a1b2b8312ef5208e2871a5f525977c",
+    "zh:c94a84895a3d9954b80e983eed4603330a5cdbbd8eef5b3c99278c2d1402ef3c",
+    "zh:de1fb712784dd8415f011ca5346a34f87fab6046c730557615247e511dbc7d98",
+    "zh:e3eafae7da550f86cae395d6660b2a0e93ec8d2b0e0e5ef982ec762e961fc952",
+    "zh:ff35fb1ab6add288f0f368981e56f780b50405accd1937131cba1137999c8d83",
+  ]
+}

infrastructure/etcd/terraform/backend.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# 与既有服务复用受限 tfstate 身份，使用独立对象与原生锁；不复用 Bao 的 state。
+terraform {
+  backend "s3" {
+    bucket                      = "tfstate"
+    key                         = "etcd/terraform.tfstate"
+    endpoints                   = { s3 = "https://s3.ad.ddupan.top" }
+    region                      = "us-east-1"
+    use_path_style              = true
+    skip_credentials_validation = true
+    skip_metadata_api_check     = true
+    skip_region_validation      = true
+    skip_requesting_account_id  = true
+    use_lockfile                = true
+  }
+}

infrastructure/etcd/terraform/main.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+terraform {
+  required_version = ">= 1.10"
+  required_providers {
+    vault = {
+      source  = "hashicorp/vault"
+      version = "~> 4.0"
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+provider "vault" {
+  address = var.bao_address
+}
+
+variable "bao_address" {
+  type    = string
+  default = "https://bao.ad.ddupan.top:8200"
+}
+variable "pki_mount" {
+  type    = string
+  default = "pki"
+}
+variable "kv_mount" {
+  type    = string
+  default = "kv"
+}
+variable "member_names" {
+  type    = list(string)
+  default = ["etcd-laptop", "etcd-pve1", "etcd-pve2"]
+}
+variable "consumer_names" {
+  type    = set(string)
+  default = ["patroni-pg-prod"]
+}
+
+# 仅管理既有 PKI 下的新 role/policy，不纳管 CA 私钥、mount 或秘密值。
+locals {
+  certificate_roles = {
+    server  = { names = var.member_names, server = true, client = false, ips = true }
+    peer    = { names = concat(var.member_names, ["homelab-etcd-peer"]), server = true, client = true, ips = true }
+    admin   = { names = ["root"], server = false, client = true, ips = false }
+    gateway = { names = var.member_names, server = false, client = true, ips = false }
+    client  = { names = [for name in var.consumer_names : "etcd-${name}"], server = false, client = true, ips = false }
+  }
+}
+resource "vault_pki_secret_backend_role" "etcd" {
+  for_each                    = local.certificate_roles
+  backend                     = var.pki_mount
+  name                        = "homelab-etcd-${each.key}"
+  allowed_domains             = each.value.names
+  allow_bare_domains          = true
+  allow_subdomains            = false
+  allow_glob_domains          = false
+  allow_any_name              = false
+  allow_localhost             = false
+  allow_wildcard_certificates = false
+  allow_ip_sans               = each.value.ips
+  server_flag                 = each.value.server
+  client_flag                 = each.value.client
+  key_type                    = "ec"
+  key_bits                    = 256
+  ttl                         = 5184000
+  max_ttl                     = 5184000
+  require_cn                  = !contains(["gateway", "client"], each.key)
+  use_csr_common_name         = true
+  use_csr_sans                = true
+}
+
+resource "vault_policy" "etcd_provisioner" {
+  name   = "homelab-etcd-provisioner"
+  policy = <<-EOT
+    path "${var.pki_mount}/sign/homelab-etcd-*" {
+      capabilities = ["update"]
+    }
+    path "${var.kv_mount}/metadata/infra/etcd/consumers/*" {
+      capabilities = ["read"]
+    }
+    path "${var.kv_mount}/data/infra/etcd/consumers/*" {
+      capabilities = ["create", "read", "update"]
+    }
+  EOT
+}
+
+# 身份绑定沿用既有控制端认证方式，创建 policy 不自动授权任何身份。
+resource "vault_policy" "etcd_consumer" {
+  for_each = var.consumer_names
+  name     = "homelab-etcd-${each.key}"
+  policy   = <<-EOT
+    path "${var.kv_mount}/data/infra/etcd/consumers/${each.key}" {
+      capabilities = ["read"]
+    }
+  EOT
+}