One ## section per date. No version numbers — services here are deployed continuously and independently, so there is nothing to tag.
Lead with a one-line summary, then a table of what changed by area.
Incidents get their own subsection, including anything self-inflicted. The post-mortem is the point: what broke, why, and whether it was latent.
Carried forward lists known gaps left open on purpose, so they do not get silently forgotten.
Agent-facing traps and procedures do not belong here — they go in CLAUDE.md under Working rules / Environment constraints.

2026-09-10

Flux 的 deployment、drift repair 和 scoped prune 闭环验证完成。

area	change
GitOps	PR #18 合并后，Flux 自行发现 revision `f257a2a` 并删除已在 `prune: true` 下重新进入 inventory 的测试 ConfigMap；未发送 reconcile annotation，`http-echo` Deployment/Service 保持 Ready，root 继续 `prune: false`
Helm migration	选定 `gitea-actions` 作为第一个 Flux HelmRelease adoption：它不承载 Git、入口、DNS、证书、数据库或 secrets controller。live StatefulSet 与 Git 都使用 regular DinD，但 Helm 保存的 release values/manifest 仍是失败的 rootless 配置；接管先固定 chart `0.1.1` 并验证 live Pod spec 不变，升级另开 PR
Helm adoption stage	为 `gitea-actions` 加入固定 chart `0.1.1` 的 HelmRepository、values ConfigMap 和 `suspend: true` HelmRelease；第一阶段只让 Flux 登记对象，确认 source 与固定 chart render 后再解除 suspend，失败策略使用 `RetryOnFailure` 以避免回滚到 stored rootless manifest
Helm adoption activate	第一阶段合并后 Flux source 与子 Kustomization 均 Ready，Helm release 仍为 revision 1，runner Pod 未 rollout；再次确认固定 chart 的完整 render 对 live 集群为零差异后，第二阶段移除 `suspend`，允许 Flux 修正 Helm 存储状态并开始 drift detection
Gitea adoption stage	开始用 Flux 接管关键 `gitea` release：固定现有 chart `12.5.3`，以 `suspend: true` 登记 HelmRelease、source、values ConfigMap 和现有 HTTPRoute，子 Kustomization 保持 `prune: false`；现有 OIDC Secret 继续只引用不覆盖，其尚未进入 OpenBao/ESO 的缺口独立跟踪
Gitea adoption activate	第一阶段合并后 source、子 Kustomization 和 HTTPRoute 均 Ready，Helm release 仍为 revision 14，Gitea Pod 未重建或重启；再次确认固定 chart 对 live 业务资源零差异后移除 `suspend`，允许 Flux 修正 Helm 存储状态并启用 drift detection
Gitea upgrade plan	规划两跳升级：chart `12.6.0` + 显式 Gitea `1.26.4`，再到 chart `12.7.0` + 显式 Gitea `1.27.3`；每个 minor 都先以 suspended desired state 合并、停机建立 CNPG/PVC 一致回滚点，再用独立 PR 激活。当前 CNPG 无连续备份、local-path PVC 无 snapshot class，因此禁止无备份直接触发数据库 migration

Carried forward: complete the two-stage zero-change gitea HelmRelease adoption, migrate its remaining manual OIDC Secret to OpenBao/ESO, then upgrade Gitea and add credential-free PR plan output before ordering the remaining Helm migrations by dependency and blast radius. Root Flux prune remains disabled until brownfield ownership is audited.

2026-09-09

Recorded the brownfield GitOps/IaC redesign before changing live infrastructure.

area	change
docs	Added `docs/homelab-gitops-redesign.md` as the durable record of control-plane boundaries, ingress and DNS consolidation, certificates, OCI recovery, CI placement, state recovery and phased adoption. It requires zero-change adoption before mutation and keeps PVE/OpenBao/Git recovery independent of k3s
OCI	Read-only discovery found the likely authoritative lost-root state in `oci-k8s-free-tier-tfstate/terraform.tfstate`: Terraform 1.15.8 state format 4, serial 249, covering the existing VM and public network. No state content or credential was committed; the bucket currently lacks versioning
secrets	Recorded that ESO 2.8.0, five ExternalSecrets and the scoped OpenBao Kubernetes-auth path already exist; the next gate is live recovery testing and migration of any remaining manual Secrets
Terraform	Recorded Gitea 1.27 State Registry as the preferred candidate for local roots after version and recovery testing; the OCI recovery root remains in OCI Object Storage to avoid a home-control-plane dependency loop
cleanup	Removed the retired NapCat tree, the Contour and Kanidm archive trees, and seven generated Terraform plan files before establishing the clean Git baseline; plans may embed complete state and remain globally ignored
CI	Added a review-first Gitea Actions runner bootstrap: official actions chart 0.1.1, pinned runner 2.3.0, one persistent instance-scoped Kubernetes runner with capacity four, plus an ESO reference to its registration token in OpenBao. The first deployment proved that rootlesskit is blocked by the node's AppArmor unprivileged-userns policy; because the chart requires privileged DinD in either mode, the reviewed fix uses regular DinD instead of weakening the host-wide policy. The runner image intentionally carries neither `uv` nor Terraform: Terraform uses its versioned setup action, while `uv` is pinned and installed from official PyPI because the nested job network reaches PyPI but times out against the GitHub API queried by `setup-uv`. Ansible installs only `ansible-core` in its tool venv and puts declared Galaxy collections in a shared path visible to ansible-lint; installing the `ansible` meta-package had made Galaxy falsely skip that shared installation
identity	Declared the Samba AD `gitea-admins` group with `panxiao81` as its initial member. Gitea already maps this OIDC group to site administrators; the local `gitea_admin` account remains as break-glass access
docs	Reconciled the redesign and CI status with reality: the Gitea remote, instance-scoped runner, OpenBao-projected registration token, green Stage 1 and Flux bootstrap are live; off-site mirroring and recovery verification remain pending
协作规范	在 `AGENTS.md` 中明确：homelab 向 `git.ddupan.top` 提交的 commit message、PR、issue 与项目文档默认优先使用中文，同时保留必要的英文技术标识符
k3s	在本机逐级从 `v1.33.6+k3s1` 升级到 `v1.33.13+k3s2`、`v1.34.11+k3s1`、`v1.35.8+k3s1`，最终到 `v1.36.4+k3s1`；每一级均建立 SQLite/server 冷备份并验证节点、工作负载、PVC、Gateway、DNS 与 Gitea。k3s 每次重启都会覆盖 CoreDNS 的手工 `serve_stale`，已按 `platform/k3s/Corefile.desired` 恢复
GitOps	Flux `v2.9.5` 的四个核心 controller 已上线；集群内只读 Gitea source 与 `prune: false` 的 root Kustomization 均在合并 revision `aaa54a1` 上 Ready，完成了首个 pull reconciliation 闭环
cleanup	已把 `bao-acme` HTTP-01 solver 改到 Envoy Gateway 的明文 listener，并删除不再承载流量的 Contour namespace、provisioner、RBAC、GatewayClass 和全部 `projectcontour.io` CRD；Envoy Gateway、证书、DNS 与 Gitea 复查正常
GitOps canary	加入由 Flux 部署到独立 `gitops-canary` namespace 的 `http-echo` Deployment 和 Service；历史 Contour HTTPRoute 明确排除在 Kustomization 之外，初始保持 `prune: false`
prune 验证	为 `http-echo` 加入无业务依赖的 `flux-prune-canary` ConfigMap；先在 `prune: false` 下确认 Flux inventory，后续通过独立 PR 删除并仅为 canary 开启 prune
prune 验证第二阶段	第一阶段已确认 `flux-prune-canary` 带 Flux ownership 标签并进入 `http-echo` inventory；从 Git 删除该测试对象，同时仅为 `http-echo` 开启 `prune: true`，root 继续保持 `prune: false`
prune 验证修正	第二阶段证明“同一 revision 开启 prune 并删除旧对象”不会回收该对象：Flux 已从 inventory 移除它，但 live ConfigMap 保留。将 ConfigMap 在已经生效的 `prune: true` 下重新纳管，下一 revision 只做删除
prune 验证最终阶段	已确认 `prune: true` 生效且测试 ConfigMap 重新进入 Flux inventory；本次只从 Git 删除该对象，不修改 canary 或 root 的 prune 设置，用于完成精确垃圾回收验证

Incident: prune 启用与对象删除放在同一 revision

测试把 http-echo 从 prune: false 改为 true 的同时从 Git 删除测试 ConfigMap。Flux 按新 revision 更新了 inventory，但没有删除按旧设置管理的 live 对象，导致 ConfigMap 成为 inventory 之外的残留。没有业务影响。修正方式是在 prune: true 已经生效后先重新纳管对象，再用下一 revision 单独删除。

Carried forward: re-verify OpenBao/ESO recovery and remaining Secret inventory; configure an off-site Git mirror; plan the Gitea upgrade beyond 1.25.5; take an encrypted independent OCI state copy before enabling bucket versioning; reconstruct the missing root to a zero-change plan; add a low-risk Flux canary workload; then move Tunnel origins to Envoy one hostname at a time.

2026-08-15

retro-pdc (NT4) has a floppy drive again — Proxmox does not offer one, so it comes in through args.

area	change
proxmox	VM 102 gained `args: -drive if=floppy,format=raw,file=/mnt/pve/laptop/template/iso/retro-pdc-fda.img` and a blank FAT12 1.44 MB image to go with it. PVE exposes no floppy in the UI or the config schema, and it launches QEMU with `-nodefaults`, so before this the guest had no A: at all — `info block` listed only `drive-ide0`/`drive-ide2`. Verified after a power cycle: `floppy0 … retro-pdc-fda.img (raw)`. Swapping the medium works live (`eject floppy0` / `change floppy0 <path>` over `qm monitor`) — the block node id changed, so it really re-inserted; only an `args` edit needs the VM stopped and started
proxmox	`roles/pve_floppy` — a ~250-line stdlib-only web UI for the thing PVE has no UI for: attach/detach a floppy drive (edits `args`) and swap the medium live (`change floppy0` over the monitor). Its own play in `site.yml`, on pve1 only — the baseline play is `serial: 1`, which would have put three copies of the same UI on the LAN. One instance is enough because `pvesh` proxies to whichever node owns the VM, verified pve1→pve3 for `config`, `monitor` and the root-only `--args` write. It shells out as root instead of using an API token because it has to: PVE gates `args` on a literal `$authuser eq 'root@pam'` (`PVE::API2::Qemu`, the `# catches args, lock, etc.` branch) and a token's authuser is `root@pam!name`. No stop/start buttons — the PVE UI has those, and this app has no authentication
proxmox	The floppy UI got authentication, without one line of PAM or LDAP code: it posts the login form to PVE's own `/access/ticket`, so it accepts every realm the cluster has — `pam` for node-local accounts and `ad` for Samba AD over verified LDAPS (`pve_auth`) — and holds no bind DN, no bind password and no realm config of its own. It talks to pvedaemon on `127.0.0.1:85` rather than `pvesh create /access/ticket` so the password never appears in a process argv, and rather than pveproxy:8006 so there is no TLS-to-self dance. Authentication alone is not enough: a session also needs `Sys.Modify` on `/` in PVE's ACL (i.e. `pve-admins-ad`), because pointing a VM at an arbitrary host file is a host-level act, not a VM-level one. Sessions are HMAC-signed cookies (HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Secure), 8 h, with the signing key generated per process — a restart logs everyone out, deliberately. Serves TLS with the node's own ACME cert and refuses to start without one (`--insecure` to override): a login form on cleartext HTTP is worse than no service. Failed logins say only "login failed", so the app cannot be used to enumerate AD
proxmox	The procedure is in `CLAUDE.md`. Not codified in `pve_vm`: VM 102 is not in `pve_vms` yet, and that gap is already tracked with the rest of the retro-pdc hardware pinning

Two things learned power-cycling it. NT4 ignores ACPI: qm shutdown 102 --timeout 60 returned "VM quit/powerdown failed - got timeout" and the guest never moved, so it has to be shut down from inside (sendkey ctrl-esc, sendkey u, sendkey s, sendkey ret over qm monitor) and then qm stopped once it shows 现在可以关掉电源. And the shutdown dialog defaults to restart, not power off — a guest restart keeps the same QEMU process, so the new args would never have taken effect.

Carried forward: the guest side is unverified — NT4 came back to the Ctrl+Alt+Del login screen and nothing here has its password. A: should hold a README.TXT written to the image from the host.

The floppy UI is deployed on pve1 and serves TLS on 8088; the realm list it renders comes back from the cluster (ad, pam, pve) and a wrong password gets "login failed" through a real pvedaemon round trip. What is still unverified is everything past a successful login — the VM table and the four actions have only ever run against a stubbed pvesh, because no password for any realm exists in the session that built it. No DNS record was needed: pve1.ad.ddupan.top already resolves, which is also why the node's own ACME cert is the right one to serve.

A modem emulator, so retro guests can dial an ISP

Retro guests expect dial-up, and there is no PSTN here. Three options were weighed before writing anything:

option	verdict
86Box's built-in Hayes modem (since 4.2, and retrolab runs 6.0)	Use it for 86Box guests. Adapter `[COM] Standard Hayes-compliant Modem`, phonebook file maps a dialled number to `host:port`, non-zero listening port makes it answer. ⚠ Turn Telnet emulation off — PPP frames start `FF 03` and telnet IAC eats them. Its built-in internet mode (dial `0.0.0.0`) is SLIP, not PPP, so it needs the guest hacked into SLIP; not what a period PC did
`tcpser` for the QEMU guests	Rejected. Not packaged past bionic (source build), and its only socket DTE transport is ip232, which is not 8-bit transparent: `ip232_write` doubles every `0xFF`, `ip232_read` steals `FF 00`/`FF 01` for DTR, and the modem injects `FF <flags>` for DCD/RI. Read the source rather than assuming — `-serial tcp:` to it would corrupt every PPP frame and every ZMODEM block. Its `-p` port is the phone line side, not the serial side, so QEMU's telnet chardev cannot be pointed at it either
`roles/retro_modem/files/atmodem.py`	Written. ~420 lines, stdlib asyncio, no deps. Listens on a unix socket (PVE's `qm set -serial0 socket` plugs straight in) or TCP, so no socat + pty sandwich. `ATD` either opens a TCP connection or hands the raw line to pppd — an ISP terminal server, which is what the machines are actually dialling. `--line <port>` gives it a phone number: an inbound TCP connection rings the guest, which answers with `ATA` or automatically once it has set `S0`. That is the half NT4's RAS needs to receive calls, and it is also how one retro guest dials another

Two non-obvious bits, both commented in place. Extended commands are &X/%X, so searching for D to find the dial command fires on the &D2 in every dialer's init string and dials "2" — consume the prefix first. And unknown commands answer OK on purpose: that is what makes an emulated modem work with dialers nobody has tested against.

S0 auto-answer needed the DTE read to be interruptible: a guest that has set S0 sends nothing while waiting for a call, so the modem sits blocked reading the serial port and could never decide to pick up on its own. The read now races an answer event.

--selftest is the acceptance test. It checks what ip232 gets wrong — dial through the phonebook, round-trip all 256 byte values unchanged, escape with +++ — then takes an inbound call both ways, by ATA and by S0. It caught a real bug: when the far end dropped, the outbound pump kept reading the serial port forever, so after NO CARRIER the modem never returned to command mode and silently swallowed every later command. Both directions now end the call.

Busy signal, and the direction bug it flushed out. A second caller now gets refused by the kernel at connect(), because an engaged modem closes its listening socket until it hangs up — a ringing line counts as engaged too. Accepting and then closing would have been worse than nothing: the caller's modem would report CONNECT and immediately NO CARRIER, which is a phantom call, not a busy tone. The dialling side maps ConnectionRefusedError to BUSY and everything else to NO CARRIER (order matters — it subclasses OSError).

Writing that exposed a wrong assumption in the usage: PVE's -serial0 socket leaves QEMU listening, so atmodem has to dial into the VM, not wait for it. Added --connect alongside --listen; 86Box and plain TCP still want the listening side. Verified against a stand-in listener — the guest end sees OK come back.

One process is one modem on one line, deliberately: that is what a modem is. An ISP's T1 into a rack of them is N processes on N ports. A single number in front of the rack is a hunt group, i.e. a dispatcher, and that is not built.

Existing AT libraries were checked and rejected, so this does not get re-litigated: almost everything on PyPI (attila, python-gsmmodem, modem-cmd, esp_modem) is the DTE side — it sends AT to a real modem. AT-Command-Emulator is DCE but GSM (AT+CMGS, SMS), so no dialling and no data mode. The one real match, tcpatmodem (MIT, PyPI), is a DCE-side interpreter — but its DTE side is stdin/stdout only, it cannot answer (RING appears solely as an entry in its result-code table; no bind/listen/accept in the source), and it was last touched in January 2019. Nor can its interpreter be lifted out on its own: its dispatch table has no &, % or \ entry and falls through to ERROR, with a and z wired to command_error outright — so AT&F and ATZ, the first things every dialer sends, both fail.

The deeper reason nothing is reusable: commands and responses are different grammars. A command line is a run of concatenated commands with no separator (AT&F&C1&D2S0=0X4E1V1) that cannot be tokenised without knowing the command set, and D swallows the rest of the line; a response is line-oriented \r\n<verb>\r\n with +CMD: <params>. DTE libraries parse the second, because a DTE never reads the first — it writes it. The one shared piece is the +CMD=<params> parameter grammar, which is the part retro dial-up does not use. Adopting it would mean a dependency, a socket↔stdio bridge, and a fork for the answering half, to replace a ~90-line parser. The AT parsing is the commodity part; the socket DTE, the answering and the pppd hand-off are not, and nothing off the shelf has them. Complete Hayes DCE implementations do exist — DOSBox-X serialmodem.cpp, 86Box net_modem.c, tcpser modem_core.c — but all are C welded into their host emulator. Read them if a dialer misbehaves.

Verified end to end against a real pppd, not just the self-test. A client pppd dialled through atmodem into the pppd atmodem spawned for the ppp phonebook target — i.e. the whole ISP chain, with no retro guest involved. From syslog:

send (ATDT5551212^M) / expect (CONNECT) / ATDT5551212^M^M / CONNECT / -- got it
Serial connection established.        Using interface ppp0 / ppp1
PAP peer authentication succeeded for retro   Remote message: Login ok
local IP address 10.62.0.1            remote IP address 10.62.0.2

Both ends came up (ppp0 10.62.0.1 ↔ ppp1 10.62.0.2), 11 frames and ~400 bytes each way. That is LCP, PAP, IPCP and IPv6CP all negotiating across the emulated modem with asyncmap 0 in /etc/ppp/options, which is the strongest 8-bit-cleanliness proof available — and it exercises the ppp target and the asyncio-subprocess pipe path, which nothing had run before. Note pppd notty forks its own charshunt onto a pty internally (Connect: ppp0 <--> /dev/pts/6); our pipes feed that fine. The test appended one line to /etc/ppp/pap-secrets and restored the file from backup afterwards, verified identical.

Then a real dialer found a real bug: ATDT;. Driven against VM 103 (Win98 SE) on pve3, whose serial0: socket atmodem attached to directly. Win98's Standard Modem opens every call like this:

DTE> ATZ                    DCE< OK
DTE> ATE0V1&C1&D2S0=0       DCE< OK      <- the init string the design was betting on
DTE> ATM1X4                 DCE< OK      <- unknown commands, answered OK not ERROR
DTE> ATDT;                  DCE< OK      <- was NO CARRIER; that killed every call
DTE> ATDT5551212            DCE< CONNECT <- Win98 only sends digits after that OK

A trailing ; means "dial, then return to command state", and Windows TAPI dials in stages — a bare ATDT; first, digits second. Answering NO CARRIER to the opener made Win98 give up before it ever sent a number, which looked exactly like a phonebook miss and was not one. dial() now accumulates staged digits and answers OK; the self-test replays the whole Win98 sequence verbatim so it cannot regress.

The two design calls that looked arbitrary are the two that carried it: consuming &/% prefixes before looking for D (or &D2 dials "2"), and answering OK to unknown commands (or M1X4 aborts the dial). tcpatmodem would have failed on line 2.

Result: Windows 98 is on the network over an emulated modem. ISP was pppd on the laptop, reached over the LAN from pve3, so nothing was installed on the node:

call from ('192.168.10.9', 57456)
ppp0  UNKNOWN  10.62.0.1 peer 10.62.0.2/32
64 bytes from 10.62.0.2: icmp_seq=1 ttl=128 time=12.8 ms   (4/4, ttl=128 = Windows)

Also learned: Win98 does not drive PVE's USB tablet, so QMP input-send-event abs clicks are accepted by QEMU and ignored by the guest — until the guest installs USB HID. And Win98's own dialling properties prepend the location's outside-line digit and country code (0 5551212, canonical 86-5551212), which digits() cannot match; untick 使用区号与拨号属性 in the connection's properties.

And then Win98 dialled NT4. Two atmodems on pve3 — one on VM 103's serial0 with the phonebook, one on VM 102's serial0 with --line 6102 — turn 5551102 into a call from the Win98 guest to retro-pdc's Remote Access Server (RETRO001, 1 port, 正在运行):

WIN98   DTE> ATDT;          DCE< OK
        DTE> ATDT5551102    DCE< CONNECT
NT4     DTE> ATH / AT / ATE0V1 / AT / ATS0=0     <- RAS initialising the port
        DCE< RING                                 <- our modem rings it
        DTE> ATA                                  <- RAS answers by hand
        DCE< CONNECT

That validates the whole answering half (--line → RING → ATA) against a real NT 4.0 RAS, and settles a design guess: RAS sets S0=0 and answers manually on RING, so the ATA path is the one that carries, and S0 auto-answer is there for DOS-era software. RAS's init sequence is a third dialer handled without changes. Everything above the modem — PPP and NT4 domain authentication against RETRO — was left to the operator, who was at the keyboard by then.

RAS then found the second real bug: +++ATH as one write. NT4 hangs up by sending the escape and the command glued together, and _dte_to_peer matched only a bare b"+++" — so the whole string was forwarded to the far end as data and the line could never be dropped. A bare +++ still waits out its trailing guard; +++ followed by a command is unambiguous, so it escapes at once and the remainder goes to the command reader through a small pushback buffer. In the logs this showed up as +++ATH → ERROR (that part is correct — in command mode real modems error too; the bug was the data-mode path).

Reading the rest of that log is a lesson in not blaming the layer you just wrote. RAS answered three calls cleanly, each running 45–75 s before RAS hung up — a failure above the modem (PPP/auth), matching 端口状态 showing 线路未连接 with zero bytes counted. And the eight unanswered RINGs were Win98 hanging up and redialling in the same second (ATH … ATDT5551102 both at 22:02:55), before RAS had re-armed its port — the period- accurate equivalent of redialling before the far end's modem has reset. RAS re-initialises with AT/ATZ/ATE0V1/ATS0=0 when it recovers.

Dialling an address directly was broken, and only asking about it found it. D takes an optional Tone/Pulse modifier, which was never stripped — so ATDT192.168.10.1:23 tried to resolve the host T192.168.10.1 and returned NO CARRIER. The phonebook path hid it completely, because lookups go through digits(). Strip exactly one modifier, never lstrip(), or ATDTtelnet.example.com loses its t. Now covered by the self-test.

telnet: targets. A raw TCP pipe is wrong for a real telnetd: dialling 192.168.10.1:23 delivered \xff\xfb\x01\xff\xfb\x03login: to the guest — IAC WILL ECHO, IAC WILL SGA rendered as ÿû☺ÿû♥ before the prompt — and an un-doubled 0xFF corrupts any 8-bit transfer. A telnet:host[:port] phonebook target now wraps the peer in a ~45-line telnet client: it swallows IAC sequences, answers DO ECHO/DO SGA and refuses everything else, un-escapes IAC IAC, and doubles 0xFF outbound. Same dial through it now yields exactly \r\nCONNECT\r\nlogin: .

It is opt-in per entry for the same reason 86Box's telnet toggle has to be turned off: enabling IAC handling on the PPP or guest-to-guest numbers would corrupt them, since there 0xFF is data — FF 03 starts every PPP frame.

Redesigned into a switchboard, which came out smaller than what it replaced. Dialling a VM cannot be another target type: the answering guest needs a modem to hear RING and reply ATA, so wiring a caller straight to its serial socket hands RAS raw bytes and it never picks up. Only a process holding both ends can ring one on behalf of the other. So one process now owns N lines (--vm 102:6102 --vm 103), and vm:102 is an internal call:

before, 2 guests	after
2 processes, 1 TCP port, 2 logs	1 process, 1 log
a `--line` port allocated per VM	internal routing by vmid
busy = open/close a listener	busy = does that line have a call
hunt group impossible	falls out of the line table

The internal hop is a socket.socketpair(), so every path below it — the pump, 8-bit cleanliness, +++, NO CARRIER — is the same validated code that carries an external call. Per-line TCP ports stay, because 86Box lives on retrolab, a different host, and has to reach a line over the network. Lines also reattach on their own now: a guest reboot takes the chardev peer with it, and a switchboard needing a restart after every VM reboot is not a service.

The phonebook is the API — there isn't one. It hot-reloads on mtime change, so editing a number no longer restarts the modem or drops a live call. That single change removes any need for a daemon protocol: the file lives on pmxcfs (/etc/pve/retro-phonebook), so pve_floppy running on pve1 edits exactly what the switchboard on pve3 reads, with no IPC, no API and no second service. The UI gained a phonebook textarea rather than becoming a new app, so it inherits the PVE ticket auth, the AD realm, TLS on the node cert and the Sys.Modify gate that were already there. (pmxcfs mtime has 1-second granularity — two edits inside one second would be missed. Irrelevant for human or UI edits.)

Targets are an allowlist, not a blocklist, and that is the security boundary: a phonebook entry is something the modem acts on — ppp and ssh: make it spawn a process — so a free-form target would be remote command execution wearing a phone number. exec: was deliberately never added for that reason, and the UI's self-test asserts what it refuses (exec:, shell metacharacters, non-numeric numbers), not just what it accepts.

Also added: ssh:user@host[:port] (the same subprocess shape as ppp, so nearly free).

The floppy UI was taking ~22 seconds a page; now 4 cold, 0 warm

Measured before changing anything, which is the whole story: every pvesh costs ~1.9 s (Perl startup plus a cluster round trip), and a monitor query forwarded to another node is 3.6 s. The page made one call for the VM list, one per VM for its config, and one per running VM for its monitor — 1 + 4 + 4 calls for four guests.

fix	why it works
Read configs off pmxcfs (`/etc/pve/.vmlist`, `/etc/pve/nodes/<node>/qemu-server/<vmid>.conf`)	Exactly the data `pvesh get .../config` returns, already replicated to every node, at file-read speed. Removed 5 of the 9 calls
Ask the monitor only about VMs that have a floppy	"What is in the drive" is meaningless for a VM with no drive. Two thirds of the monitor calls were asking anyway
Run the survivors in parallel	`ThreadingHTTPServer` already gives each request a thread; fanning out inside it makes N round trips cost about one
Cache, TTL 30 s, cleared by every action	At the 5 s I first wrote, every click still missed — the TTL has to be longer than a human's click interval to ever be warm

Result: 14.4 s just for the list+config calls became a file read, and the page went ~22 s → 4.04 s cold, 0.000 s warm, same data. The remaining 4 s is one forwarded monitor call and is the floor for pvesh; beating it needs the API over HTTP with a retained ticket, i.e. server-side session state this app deliberately does not have (its sessions are stateless signed cookies). Not worth it for a page that is now instant in use.

Config parsing has its own test: snapshots are appended as [name] sections after the live config so parsing must stop at the first one, and the split is on the first colon only because an args value is full of them.

The login page was its own 1.9 s, before any of that: realms() ran a pvesh on every unauthenticated hit to list something that changes when an auth domain is added, i.e. never. Cached for the process lifetime — 2.01 s cold, then 0.034 s.

Deployed with --tags floppy; a second run reports changed=0.

The deploy failed on pve_floppy's own self-check, which then passed on a rerun. Chasing the flake rather than re-running found a real bug in session cookies, not in the test:

return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(msg + b"|" + _mac(msg)).decode()   # sign
msg, sig = raw.rsplit(b"|", 1)                                     # verify

The signature is the raw 32-byte HMAC digest, and 32 random bytes contain 0x7C — the byte for | — about 12 % of the time (1 - (255/256)**32). When they did, rsplit split the token inside its own signature, compare_digest failed, and the user was bounced back to the login page. Random, unreproducible, and it had been there since the app was written — never noticed because, as recorded above, nothing past a successful login had ever been exercised.

Fix: sign with _mac(msg).hex(), which cannot contain the separator. The regression test does 300 round trips rather than one, because a single round trip passed ~88 % of the time and that is exactly how this survived having a test at all. Verified 20/20 self-test runs on the node after deploying, and the service is confirmed running the new binary — the failed run had installed the file but died before its restart handler, leaving the old code live.

Not yet done: DTR-drop hangup, S-registers beyond S0, and the retro_modem Ansible role — the switchboard runs from /tmp on pve3 and the pve_floppy change is not deployed.

retronet's WINS now points at the NT4 PDC, not the production DC

retro-pdc came up on its static 10.61.0.5 with the WINS service installed, so retronet's DHCP wins-server moved from 192.168.10.5 (the Samba DC) to it — vyos_router defaults, applied and saved, second run changed=0. Verified end to end rather than assumed: TCP/42 and 139 open, nmblookup -A shows the box holding RETRO<1b> / RETRO<1d> / ..__MSBROWSE__. (it is the domain master browser), a recursive WINS query through it resolves RETRO01<00> → 10.61.0.5, and kea's generated config carries netbios-name-servers: 10.61.0.5 for the subnet. That removes retronet's last dependency on the production DC. Note the NetBIOS domain is RETRO, host RETRO01 — not RETRONET, which is only the VNet/shared-network name.

⚠ option wins-server is a multi-value node, so the role's set line added a second server rather than replacing the first — both were live, and both were written to config.boot by the play's save: true. Removed with an explicit delete. The role is set-lines-only by design and can never remove a stale value; changing any multi node needs a one-off delete against the live box. Trap recorded in CLAUDE.md.

2026-07-28

The repo got git history for the first time; a stage-1 lint gate; and auth.ddupan.top now resolves on the LAN instead of via Cloudflare.

area	change
repo	First commit ever — 490 files, ~11.8 MB. Root `.gitignore` added; ~13 GB of ISOs, WinPE images, HF model blobs, `node_modules` and vendored netboot menus excluded, along with nine secret-bearing files. Later the same day `blocky/logs/` joined them — Blocky writes one query log per day, the first had already been committed, so it is ignored and `git rm --cached`d. It stays in the history of `fde9ff2`: every DNS query the LAN made that day, no credentials
ci	Stage-1 lint: `yamllint`, `ansible-lint`, `terraform fmt`/`validate`. Config tuned against a real run — 293 YAML errors down to 0, 300 Ansible findings down to 34
proxmox	Added `ansible/requirements.yml`. It had never existed, while the other two Ansible projects declared theirs — so `ansible.netcommon`, `vyos.vyos`, `ansible.posix` and `community.general` were undeclared and a fresh checkout could not reproduce the environment
cert-manager	`certificate-auth-ddupan.yaml` — LE cert for `auth.ddupan.top`. The `*.ad.ddupan.top` wildcard cannot cover it: different zone, one label shallower
envoy-gateway	Second HTTPS listener `https-auth`, SNI-selected. The existing `*.ad.ddupan.top` listener is untouched
authelia	`httproute.yaml` routes `auth.ddupan.top` to the `authelia` Service
k3s	CoreDNS answers `auth.ddupan.top` with the gateway (192.168.10.127) and suppresses AAAA
gitea	Actions enabled (`ENABLED=true`, `DEFAULT_ACTIONS_URL=github`). No runner deployed yet, so nothing executes
victoriametrics	25 whitespace fixes, each verified to parse to an identical document. Two alert-rule files were deliberately not fixed — their trailing spaces sit inside `\|` literal block scalars and are part of the alert text
docs	`CHANGELOG.md` (this file) and `docs/cicd.md`, the CI/CD design. `docs/superpowers/` retired — its only work, the 2026-04-18 CloudNativePG migration, shipped and has been healthy 101 days
secrets	All four secret-bearing configs returned to git. cloudflared: the credentials Secret and `config.yml` ConfigMap were dead — deleted rather than externalised (see below); the tunnel token moved to a gitignored `secret.yaml` with a committed template. gitea: DB password moved to a `gitea-db` Secret, injected via `gitea.additionalConfigFromEnvs` as `GITEA__DATABASE__PASSWD`. litellm-gateway: compose now interpolates `${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}` from its already-gitignored `.env`. authelia: all seven pieces of secret material moved into Secrets via `secret.existingSecret` + `secret.additionalSecrets`, which also took the OIDC signing key out of a plaintext ConfigMap (see below)
external-secrets	ESO 2.8.0 deployed, pulling all four Secrets from OpenBao. The operator authenticates with its own ServiceAccount JWT via bao's Kubernetes auth backend, so no credential is stored in the cluster. Policy scoped to `kv/k8s/*` read-only — narrower than the human `admin` policy
openbao	Kubernetes auth backend enabled and configured for the first time — it had never existed. Two stale defaults fixed: `openbao_k8s_host` pointed at `192.168.10.10` (nothing listens there), and `openbao_addr` used `127.0.0.1`, which now fails TLS because bao's Let's Encrypt cert has a DNS SAN only
terraform	All four roots migrated from local state to SeaweedFS S3 (`tfstate` bucket), with native `use_lockfile` locking. Reached over a new LAN route (`s3.ad.ddupan.top`) rather than `obj.ddupan.top`, so state does not depend on the WAN
seaweedfs	S3 identities moved out of `values.yaml` into OpenBao via ESO, plus a least-privilege `terraform` identity scoped to the state bucket
blocky	Staged, not deployed. LAN resolver + ad-blocker + split-horizon DNS, as a compose stack on the laptop. Fills a real gap: there is nowhere today to put a LAN record for a `ddupan.top` name — the DC is authoritative only for `ad.ddupan.top`, and the NEC IX has no static-host feature
gitea	LAN route added: cert for `git.ddupan.top`, a third gateway listener (`https-git`) and an HTTPRoute. Serves HTTP 200 in 32ms, so `git push` no longer has to leave the LAN. DNS not yet switched — nothing resolves it locally until Blocky or a DC zone lands
smtp-relay	DKIM signing enabled for `ddupan.top` — mail relayed via M365 was landing in Junk. The signing config existed but had never been switched on (`Enabled: False`, `Status: CnameMissing`), so outbound mail carried only the tenant's `*.onmicrosoft.com` signature, which does not align with `ddupan.top`. No DNS change was needed
tailscale	The PVE SDN subnets are now advertised — the laptop, the tailnet's only subnet router, offered `192.168.10.0/24` and nothing else, so `10.60.0.0/24` (labnet) and `10.61.0.0/24` (retronet) were unreachable from the tailnet even though the laptop has had OSPF routes to both all along. Recorded in `tailscale/subnet-routes.sh` rather than left as shell history, since the whole failure mode is forgetting the step. retronet is included deliberately: quarantining it from the LAN is the point, quarantining it from the tailnet just forces a second VPN. Both still need approving in the admin console
retrolab	86Box mouse capture fixed over RDP. xorgxrdp's pointer declares relative axes (`REL_X`/`REL_Y`, range `-1..-1`) but posts absolute screen coordinates through them — `xf86PostMotionEvent(dev, TRUE, …)`. 86Box's XInput2 backend trusts the declared mode and fed those absolutes in as movement deltas, pinning the emulated pointer in a corner the moment you clicked to capture. 86Box only ever exempts pointers by device name (`TigerVNC pointer`, `Virtual core XTEST pointer`), so `retro_desktop` now renames the xrdp pointer to `TigerVNC pointer` in `/etc/X11/xrdp/xorg.conf`. Also gave the role's channel-read task `check_mode: false`, without which every `--check` run asserted that audio was broken

The hostname deliberately did not change. Issuer, redirect URIs and cookie domain all remain auth.ddupan.top, so no OIDC client needed re-registering — only the network path moved. The public route (Cloudflare → tunnel → cloudflared → authelia) still works and terminates at the same Service.

Incident — retrolab logins came up with no window manager (self-inflicted)

No title bars, no Applications menu, so no way to log out — reported as "I can't logout now", and it came back after the move to pve3 because the cause is persistent, not transient.

xfce4-session restores exactly the client list in ~/.cache/sessions/xfce4-session-retrolab:10, and that list had Count=4: xfsettingsd, xfce4-panel, Thunar, xfdesktop — no xfwm4. Once the WM is missing from a saved session, every later login is WM-less too.

Self-inflicted, and the recovery caused the relapse: xfwm4 had died earlier (cause unknown, .xsession-errors shows an older Another compositing manager is running on screen 0), and it was restarted over SSH with xfwm4 --replace. That process has no SESSION_MANAGER in its environment — it logs "Failed to connect to session manager" — so the next session save did not record it.

Fixed on the host: restarted the WM, set xfconf-query -c xfce4-session -p /general/SaveOnExit -n -t bool -s false, and deleted the stale session file. Left as a documented trap in roles/retro_desktop/tasks/main.yml rather than a task — see the comment there for why automating it costs more than it saves. The distro's failsafe session does not help: xrdp never offers the greeter that selects it.

retrolab moved from pve1 to pve3 — 86Box was CPU-starved

86Box emulation stuttered and the emulated Sound Blaster glitched. pve1 is an i3-6100U, 2 cores / 4 threads at 2.3 GHz, and it also carries vyos-rtr; it was sitting at load 2.0 with 50% CPU. 86Box's recompiler is effectively single-threaded, so it wanted clock, not cores.

pve3 was the target rather than pve2 for a storage reason, not a CPU one — both are Ryzen 5 PRO 2400GE (4c/8t, 3.2 GHz) and both idle, but LINSTOR holds an UpToDate replica on pve3 and only a Diskless one on pve2, so on pve2 every block would have crossed the network to another node's disk.

cpu: host was already set, which is most of the performance win but also forced the migration to be offline: pve1 is Intel, pve2/pve3 are AMD, and a live migration would have handed the running kernel a different feature set. Shutdown, qm migrate (2 seconds — nothing to copy, shared DRBD), start. The guest now reports the Ryzen. vm:101 is not an HA resource, so nothing else needed rearranging.

Verified after the move, because this was the first time either SDN VNet had to leave a node: the DHCP reservation still resolves (10.60.0.10, VLAN 100), and br-retro reaches the VyOS gateway 10.61.0.1 on VLAN 110 — both now crossing the physical 1G LAN to reach vyos on pve1 instead of staying inside one host. xrdp and the laptop's /mnt/iso NFS mount came back on their own.

Win98 took a hard power-off (ScanDisk on next boot): the guest OS ignored ACPI shutdown until its timeout, and the desktop session could not be driven to shut the emulator down cleanly first.

86Box's Win98 guest could not DHCP — the emulated cable was unplugged

Symptom: Win98 on retronet got only an APIPA address, winipcfg renew failed instantly with "DHCP 服务器不存在". Everything downstream of the guest was healthy and measured that way: br-retro up with enp6s19 and tap0 enslaved and forwarding, an address temporarily added to br-retro pinged the VyOS gateway 10.61.0.1, and kea was listening on 10.61.0.1:67 with the RETRONET pool configured.

The tell was ip -s link show tap0: RX 0 packets, ever — TX counted the frames the bridge flooded toward the guest, but 86Box had never written a single frame from it. Not a fabric problem at all.

Cause: net_01_link = 2 in ~/86Box VMs/98/86box.cfg. In 86Box NET_LINK_DOWN = (1 << 1), so the value means the NIC's link is down — 86Box's own "unplug the cable" toggle, reachable by clicking the network icon in its status bar. The default is 504 (every speed/duplex bit set); deleting the line restores it. The guest driver was fine throughout: it read its MAC (00:E0:4C:CB:7A:58) off the emulated PROM and bound TCP/IP normally.

Fixed by removing the line and restarting the emulator. Win98 now holds 10.61.0.107 from the RETRONET pool, first lease that segment has ever handed out.

Consequence, and the reason the VM does not boot unattended: the NIC's boot ROM is enabled (bios = 1 under [Realtek RTL8029AS #1]), and with the link up Etherboot 5.4.4 now runs a DHCP loop at every boot instead of failing instantly. It never accepts kea's reply — the reply is on the wire, addressed to the card, and Etherboot still prints No IP address — so it retries indefinitely and the machine never reaches the hard disk. Press Q at Boot from (N)etwork or (Q)uit? to skip it; set bios = 0 if PXE on retronet is not wanted. Left as-is: enabling that ROM looks deliberate.

Incident — retrolab's desktop stranded again (needrestart, second occurrence)

Same failure as 2026-07-25, different trigger. unattended-upgrades upgraded libc6 at 06:28:37, and needrestart restarted xrdp-sesman at 06:28:55. sesman came back with an empty session table and could no longer reattach the running :10 display, so every reconnect started a new one — and xfce4-session refuses to run twice for the same user, so each died in about a second (Window manager (pid 102992, display 11) exited quickly (1 secs)). The desktop and its 86Box Win98 VM kept running, just permanently unreachable.

The 2026-07-25 fix was NEEDRESTART_MODE: l in retrolab.yml, which only ever covered our playbook runs. Ubuntu's automatic upgrades were never in scope, which is why the same thing happened again eight hours before anyone noticed.

Recovered by killing :10 outright (86Box included — no way to save it, the session could not be reached to shut it down). Fixed properly with /etc/needrestart/conf.d/50-xrdp.conf pinning qr(^xrdp) to 0, deployed by the retro_desktop role. This is the mechanism needrestart already uses for gdm, sddm and xdm — xrdp-sesman is the same class of service and simply was not on the list. Trade accepted: sesman runs against the old libc until the host reboots.

Watch for this on any other host that grows a long-lived xrdp session.

Incident — Gitea down ~12 minutes (self-inflicted trigger, latent cause)

Enabling Actions required a helm upgrade, and the chart's strategy: Recreate kills the old pod before starting the new one. The new pod never came up.

The cause was not the config change. configure-gitea is an init container running gitea admin auth update-oauth, which fetches autoDiscoverUrl before Gitea will start. That URL was unreachable, so the init container exited non-zero and the pod crash-looped. Any restart — node reboot, eviction, chart bump — would have done the same. Rolling back would not have helped, because the rollback also restarts the pod.

Restored by temporarily commenting out the oauth: block (the auth source stays in Gitea's DB; commenting only stops the init-time sync), then permanently by moving auth.ddupan.top onto the LAN.

Incident — a dead VPN tunnel masquerading as a bad ISP

[email protected] reported active running and its interface was UP, but the tunnel was dead — 100% loss to its own gateway, 29,156 dropped TX packets. Its 58 split-tunnel routes stayed installed, blackholing Cloudflare (104.21/16, 172.67/16), Fastly (151.101/16), Microsoft 13.107.x, AWS CloudFront and Akamai. github.com is not in that route set, which is why it kept working and made the failure look like selective CDN blocking.

This was the real cause of the Gitea outage above, of pypi.org being unreachable, and — because pods use the host routing table — of the same blackhole applying cluster-wide. pve1 was unaffected throughout, having no tun0. Fixed by restarting the service.

DKIM: the CNAMEs were right all along

The published CNAMEs matched Selector1CNAME/Selector2CNAME exactly, yet ddupan1.d-v1.dkim.mail.microsoft was NXDOMAIN — which reads as a wrong tenant label and sends you hunting for the "real" value. It is not. Microsoft creates the tenant host only when signing is enabled, so the target cannot resolve before Set-DkimSigningConfig -Enabled $true. The NXDOMAIN was the expected pre-enable state, not a fault. After enabling, the zone answered NOERROR and both selectors served 2048-bit keys immediately.

Corollary: Status: CnameMissing on a config that has never been enabled does not mean your DNS is wrong. Enable it and re-check before touching DNS.

Verified end-to-end, headers of a test message received at an external Outlook.com account: dkim=pass (signature was verified) header.d=ddupan.top, spf=pass, dmarc=pass, compauth=pass reason=100.

It still landed in Junk — X-MS-Exchange-Organization-SCL: 5 (X-Message-Delivery decodes to SCL=6), dest:J, RF:JunkEmail. Note the split: the tenant-side outbound stamp was SCL:1, so the score came from the receiving consumer filter. Authentication is a precondition for good placement, not a guarantee of it — the remainder is reputation (ddupan.top has no sending history and relays via a shared M365 outbound pool, 52.101.228.88) plus content (the test messages were one-line bodies with "test" in the subject, no charset, no MIME-Version — a worst case for scoring). Nothing further to configure; it needs real traffic, time, and "not junk" marks.

Discovered — IPv6 broken host-wide on the laptop (not fixed)

Connect-ExchangeOnline -Device hung with no output. The cause was not the module: br0 has no global IPv6 address, because net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding=1 (needed for libvirt/k3s) makes the kernel default accept_ra to 0, so SLAAC never runs — while NetworkManager still installed a v6 default route. The only global v6 address on the box belongs to tun0, so source selection hands it to routes that egress br0. Packets leave the LAN wearing the VPN's address and nothing returns; the socket sits in SYN-SENT.

This is not the known dead-tunnel trap. The VPN was healthy — its gateway pinged, v4 through it worked. ip route get says dev br0 and looks innocent; the tell is the source address, not the device. Anything that resolves AAAA and does not fall back fast hangs the same way — .NET does not do Happy Eyeballs, which is why curl masks the fault entirely.

Worked around per-process with DOTNET_SYSTEM_NET_DISABLEIPV6=1. Not fixed at host level: the fix is net.ipv6.conf.br0.accept_ra=2, which changes IPv6 behaviour for k3s, libvirt and NFS on the lab's single point of failure and deserves its own change window.

The Authelia OIDC signing key was in a ConfigMap, not a Secret

Externalising authelia/values.yaml turned up a live exposure rather than a git-hygiene problem. The chart's files/configuration.oidc.jwk.yaml branches on how the key is supplied: key.path reads it from a mounted file at runtime, but key.value inlines it directly into the ConfigMap. values.yaml used value:, so the RSA key that signs every ID token for auth.ddupan.top was sitting in plaintext in a ConfigMap — readable by anything with get configmap in that namespace, and not encrypted at rest the way a Secret can be.

Fixed by moving all seven pieces of secret material into Kubernetes Secrets (secret.existingSecret for six, secret.additionalSecrets for the JWKS key) and referencing them by path:. The Secrets were built from the live chart-generated Secret, so no key material changed — verified afterwards by the JWKS endpoint still serving kid=main with the same modulus, meaning no issued token was invalidated and nobody was logged out.

authelia/values.yaml is now committed. That was the last of the four configs gitignored for embedded secrets.

Incident — Authelia down ~5 minutes on the first attempt

The first upgrade put the JWKS key as a seventh key inside the existingSecret. The chart projects that volume with an explicit items: list containing only the six keys it generates, so the extra key was stored but never mounted. Authelia died on open /secrets/internal/…jwks.main.pem: no such file or directory, which cascaded into every other option appearing "required" because the whole config template had failed to render.

Rolled back first to restore SSO, then fixed with secret.additionalSecrets, which mounts a second Secret at /secrets/<name>. Two lessons: helm template is not sufficient on its own — it happily rendered a config referencing a file no volume projected — so the check that matters is cross-referencing every /secrets/... reference against the rendered volumes' items:. And the existingSecret volume mounts at /secrets/internal, not /secrets/<name>.

Live S3 credentials were committed in the initial commit — now rotated

Rotated 2026-07-28. The leaked anvAdmin key is dead: verified denied against the live endpoint. anvReadOnly and terraform were never exposed and were left alone.

Rotating it broke research-auto, which turned out to be using the cluster-wide admin key as its own S3 credentials. That dependency was invisible from this repo — the app lives in ~/research-auto and its Secret had been applied ad hoc, with no owner references and its whole k8s/ directory untracked. Finding it needed a scan of every Secret in the cluster for the leaked key, not a grep of this repo.

Fixed properly rather than by re-pointing it at the new admin key: research-auto now has its own SeaweedFS identity scoped to the research bucket, written into ~/research-auto/k8s/secrets.yaml (gitignored, alongside the existing secrets.example.yaml template) and applied. Both deployments were restarted — these are env vars, so running pods keep the old value until recreated.

The orphaned seaweedfs-s3-secret, which the chart stopped generating once existingConfigSecret was set but which still held the dead key, was deleted. A cluster-wide scan now finds the leaked key in no Secret at all.

Original exposure

seaweedfs/values.yaml carried the anvAdmin accessKey/secretKey inline and went into git with the very first commit. They are still in history.

They survived three separate secret scans. The reason is instructive: the scan regex looked for secret[:=], and the key is written secretKey: — the word "secret" is followed by "Key", not a colon. Together with the earlier PASSWD: miss (case) and the values.yaml/auth.json misses (filename, not content), that is three different ways the same class of scan fails.

Now externalised: the identities live in OpenBao at kv/k8s/seaweedfs-s3, ESO syncs them, and the chart reads filer.s3.existingConfigSecret instead of rendering credentials from values. The leaked anvAdmin key still needs rotating — externalising stops it getting worse, it does not undo history.

The cloudflared config was dead, not secret-bearing

Externalising cloudflared/cloudflared.yaml turned out to be the wrong fix: the embedded ConfigMap and credentials Secret were not in use at all. Three independent proofs — the config routed idm.ddupan.top to keycloak (retired 2026-07-10); it pointed auth.ddupan.top at authelia:9091, which 502s, while Terraform had corrected that to :80 and auth demonstrably works; and the credentials volume mounted subPath: <uuid>.json against a Secret whose key was credentials-file, so that mount never resolved.

The tunnel is token-managed and its ingress rules come from the Cloudflare API via cloudflared/terraform. Confirmed on restart, which logged Updated to new configuration carrying exactly the Terraform-managed rules, with authelia:80. So both documents were deleted instead of being re-plumbed.

Carried forward

The OpenBao PostgreSQL secrets engine is the next step beyond static values: Gitea and Authelia both read their credentials only at startup, so short-TTL dynamic credentials would break them. Static roles (stable username, scheduled password rotation) plus something to restart the consumer is the shape that fits. gitea.extraEnvSourceFile and Authelia's path: indirection already read from files, which is what an OpenBao agent-injector writes.
The cloudflared-tunnel Secret still carried the dead credentials-file key until today: kubectl apply MERGES, so removing it from the manifest did not remove it from the cluster. Removed with a JSON patch. Worth remembering whenever a key is dropped from a Secret.
.terraform.lock.hcl is ignored in openbao/ and netbox/ but committed in the other two roots. That is backwards — provider versions should be pinned.
Gitea's Ingress declares no class, and the only classes present are contour (retired) and tailscale. Gitea is therefore reachable only via the Cloudflare tunnel, i.e. it depends on the WAN.
No Actions runner deployed; CI substrate undecided.
IPv6 is broken on the laptop (see above). Worked around per-process only; net.ipv6.conf.br0.accept_ra=2 still needs applying deliberately.
ddupan.top still publishes SPF ~all and DMARC p=none. Both should harden (-all, p=quarantine) once a few days of aggregate reports confirm DKIM passes — hardening before that would quarantine the lab's own mail.

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