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90 lines
4.5 KiB
YAML
90 lines
4.5 KiB
YAML
---
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# Non-secret variables shared by all plays. EDIT THESE to your environment.
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# Secrets live in group_vars/vault.yml (encrypted) — see vault.example.yml.
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# --- Domain identity (used by both the DC and the Windows join) ---
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samba_ad_realm: "AD.DDUPAN.TOP"
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samba_ad_domain: "DDUPAN"
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samba_ad_dc_hostname: "dc1"
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samba_ad_dc_ip: "192.168.10.5"
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samba_ad_dns_forwarder: "192.168.10.1"
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samba_ad_reverse_zone: "10.168.192.in-addr.arpa" # reverse of 192.168.10.0/24
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# Extra A records for non-domain hosts published in the AD DNS zone.
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samba_ad_extra_a_records:
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- { name: "bao", ip: "192.168.10.8" } # OpenBao (../openbao), not domain-joined
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# Proxmox cluster nodes (../proxmox). Not domain-joined; they authenticate
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# USERS against this DC rather than being members themselves.
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- { name: "pve1", ip: "192.168.10.4" }
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- { name: "pve2", ip: "192.168.10.7" }
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- { name: "pve3", ip: "192.168.10.9" }
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# Lab VMs on the SDN VNets (routed via the VyOS router, see ../../proxmox).
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# These are NOT on 192.168.10.0/24, so they have no PTR in the existing
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# reverse zone — forward resolution only unless a 0.60.10.in-addr.arpa zone
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# is added later.
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- { name: "retrolab", ip: "10.60.0.10" }
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# k3s services exposed on the LAN through the Envoy gateway (../../../platform/envoy-gateway;
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# Contour was retired 2026-07-25). They all point at the k3s node, which is where
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# Envoy's LoadBalancer lands; the gateway routes by Host header and serves the
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# *.ad.ddupan.top wildcard cert.
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# Adding another such service = one more line here + an HTTPRoute, nothing else.
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- { name: "netbox", ip: "192.168.10.127" } # NetBox (../../../apps/netbox)
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# SeaweedFS S3. Exists so Terraform state does NOT ride the Cloudflare tunnel:
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# obj.ddupan.top works, but it hairpins through the WAN, and on 2026-07-28 that
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# path was blackholed for hours by a dead VPN tunnel. State must stay on the LAN.
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- { name: "s3", ip: "192.168.10.127" } # SeaweedFS S3 (../../../apps/seaweedfs)
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# Support legacy clients (Win9x/NT4/2000/XP)? INSECURE — see README "Retro clients".
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samba_ad_legacy_clients: false
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# --- KMS auto-activation via DNS ---
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# Adds a _vlmcs._tcp SRV record so any domain-joined Windows self-activates against
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# vlmcsd. Set the IP where vlmcsd listens (:1688); empty string disables.
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samba_ad_kms_host_ip: "192.168.10.127" # vlmcsd runs here (docker, 0.0.0.0:1688)
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samba_ad_kms_hostname: "kms" # A record kms.ad.ddupan.top -> that IP
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samba_ad_kms_port: 1688
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# --- Windows admin box ---
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win_dc_ip: "{{ samba_ad_dc_ip }}"
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win_domain_dns_name: "{{ samba_ad_realm | lower }}"
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win_domain_admin_user: "{{ samba_ad_domain }}\\Administrator"
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win_kms_host: "" # e.g. "kms.example.com:1688" (existing vlmcsd)
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win_kms_client_key: "" # public GVLK for the Windows edition
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# --- Secret indirection: real values come from the encrypted vault ---
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samba_ad_admin_password: "{{ vault_samba_ad_admin_password }}"
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win_domain_admin_password: "{{ vault_samba_ad_admin_password }}"
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# --- Service accounts for apps that BIND to LDAP (passwords in vault.yml) ---
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# Previously created by hand (svc-authelia); codified so a DC rebuild restores them.
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samba_ad_service_accounts:
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- name: svc-pve
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password: "{{ vault_pve_bind_password }}"
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description: "Proxmox VE realm bind + user/group sync (read-only)"
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# --- Groups used for RBAC by downstream apps ---
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# NOTE: PVE renames synced groups to "<name>-<realm>", so pve-admins becomes
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# "pve-admins-ad" inside Proxmox. Grant ACLs to THAT name, not this one.
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samba_ad_groups:
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- name: pve-admins
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members: [panxiao81]
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# Gitea maps this OIDC group to site administrators through oauth2.adminGroup.
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# Keep at least one human administrator independent of the local break-glass account.
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- name: gitea-admins
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members: [panxiao81]
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# NetBox: Authelia forward-auth restricts the site to this group, and NetBox maps it
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# to is_superuser + is_staff via REMOTE_AUTH_SUPERUSER_GROUPS / STAFF_GROUPS
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# (../../../apps/netbox). Membership is re-evaluated on every request, so removing someone
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# here revokes their NetBox admin immediately.
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- name: netbox-admins
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members: [panxiao81]
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# Who may log in to AD-joined workstations (SSSD simple_allow_groups).
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# NESTING DIRECTION MATTERS: pve-admins is a MEMBER OF this group, so admins
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# get lab access. The reverse (this group inside pve-admins) would hand every
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# lab user Proxmox Administrator on / — see the ACL in proxmox/ansible.
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- name: retrolab-users
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members: [pve-admins]
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